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INTRODUCTION
 
“When it comes down to whose story to believe—the criminal 
suspect or the police officer—in situations unlikely to involve other 
witnesses, the officer has a distinct advantage.”1  This advantage is 
particularly pronounced in cases where the criminal defendant con­
tends that the officer was the first (or only) aggressor and the of­
ficer maintains that he or she only used force as an appropriate last 
resort in response to the defendant’s criminally violent behavior.2 
In fact, even in cases where the defendant is able to produce 
percipient witnesses, 
[t]hose who attempt to corroborate allegations of brutality are 
often dismissed as untrustworthy or self-serving, because they are 
often friends or relatives of the [defendant], or gang members, or 
* This Article would not have been possible without the love and support we 
received from our spouses, Mara and Kregg; our parents, Michael and Judy; our sisters, 
Maggie and Bridie; and our sons, Matan, Quinn, and Eber.  We would also like to thank 
and acknowledge David Hoose for his mentorship, Barb Munro for her friendship, and 
Bonnie Allen for her inspiring advocacy on behalf of indigent defendants. 
1. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 466 (2004). 
2. As will be discussed, 
[p]olice officers will [sometimes] invent cover charges when a suspect is in­
jured during apprehension or while in custody.  In order for the officer to de­
fend against a potential claim of excessive force, he will attest that the injuries 
were a result of the defendant’s assault on the officer or on the defendant’s 
having resisted apprehension. 
David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
455, 476 (1999); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omis­
sion of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW  ENG. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993) 
(describing this process as “[l]ying to cover a mistake and [using] a criminal charge to 
buttress the lie” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
73 
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people who have had brushes with the law, or uneducated and 
inarticulate, or, for a variety of other reasons, easy to 
marginalize.3 
Once “such corroboration is discounted, and . . . the credibility 
dispute is falsely reduced to a swearing contest between officer and 
[defendant], the tie goes to the officer.”4  In the eyes of the fact-
finder, the police are presumed to be disinterested witnesses 
whereas defendants have an obvious stake in the outcome of the 
proceedings.5 
For defense counsel facing this predicament, the standard pro­
tocol throughout the country has included an investigation into the 
arresting officer’s history of using unnecessary or excessive force, 
with an eye towards introducing such evidence at trial.6  Indeed, 
3. Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001). 
4. Id. 
5. Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as 
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 233, 245 (1998) (“Police testimony, even perjurious testimony, is more persuasive 
to juries than testimony by civilian witnesses. . . . [O]fficers have special credibility.  In a 
confrontation between a civilian and a ‘blue knight,’ a clear-eyed uniformed police of­
ficer, jurors may well bend over backwards to believe the person in blue.”).  Sadly, the 
penchant for crediting the testimony of police officers just because they are police of­
ficers does not appear to be a phenomenon limited to juries.  As one judge stated while 
speaking on the condition of anonymity, 
Many times, I feel the police are lying, but I can’t make a finding on a hunch. 
I’ve got to have some facts. If the defense can’t show anything, that the police 
officer is telling a lie, then I have to find for the policeman. . . . You walk into a 
case and as a rule you believe the police officer—you’ve got to believe police 
more than defendant. 
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule 
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 119 (1992); see also Donald A. 
Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 
696 (1996) (“In a swearing contest, the trial judge can discredit the police testimony 
only by branding the police as liars and accepting the word of an apparent felon.  Typi­
cally the police, rather than the felon, will be telling the truth, but in a significant num­
ber of cases the police account is false.  Nonetheless judges decide cases one at a time, 
so the police almost always win the swearing contest.  The police are aware of this bias. 
The resulting incentives are exquisitely perverse. . . . [P]olice officers indifferent to con­
stitutional rights can violate them with impunity.” (citation omitted)). 
6. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s Right to Discovery or Inspection 
of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of, Peace Officer 
Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170, 1175 (1978) (“Within the cases in which a de­
fendant, charged with an offense involving violence against a peace officer alleged by 
the defendant to have been the aggressor, sought discovery or inspection of the officer’s 
personnel records, such disclosure has occasionally been totally disallowed but usually 
has been at least partially allowed, either in the form of in camera inspection by or in 
the presence of the trial judge or in the form of direct disclosure to the defendant.” 
(citations omitted)); see also People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 30 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A 
75 
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the general rule seems to be that where the officer is alleged to 
be the aggressor, his personnel file may be obtained by the defen­
dant, or, at least, the defendant is entitled to have the trial judge 
examine the file in camera and determine whether the file con­
tains anything favorable to the defendant which is not already 
known to the defendant.7 
Massachusetts has always been something of an anomaly.  Un­
like most jurisdictions, Massachusetts did not permit evidence of an 
alleged victim’s propensity for violence unless the defendant assert­
ing a claim of self-defense was aware of such a propensity at the 
time of the incident.8  In other words, unless a defendant happened 
to know that his arresting officer had a history of using excessive or 
unnecessary force, such evidence could not be admitted at trial.9 
Consequently, defendants seeking evidence of officer misconduct in 
the custody of internal-affairs divisions usually failed to demon­
strate the requisite “specific, good faith reason for believing that 
the information is relevant to a material issue in the criminal pro­
ceedings and could be of real benefit to the defense.”10 
This all changed, or at least should have changed, in 2005, 
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) decided 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant.11  In Adjutant, the court recognized 
that “evidence of a victim’s prior violent conduct may be probative 
of whether the victim was the first aggressor where a claim of self-
defense has been asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in 
defendant who is charged with assaulting a police officer is entitled to disclosure of the 
fact that complaints charging excessive use of force have been filed against that officer.” 
(citation omitted)); Meyer v. City and County of Honolulu, 731 P.2d 149, 150 (Haw. 
1986) (instances of police officers’ wrongdoing are admissible to establish the original 
aggressor). 
7. JACK  GOGER, GEORGIA  CRIMINAL  TRIAL  PRACTICE § 17-10, at 1133 (2009); 
see also Francis C. Amendola et al., Police Personnel Records, 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law 
§ 681 (2009) (collecting cases); DAVID  RUDOVSKY & LEONARD  SOSNOV, 2 WEST’S 
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 9.8, at 143 (2d ed. 2001). 
8. In such cases, a defendant would have been permitted to introduce evidence of 
the victim’s violent character “to show the defendant’s reasonable apprehension for his 
safety.”  Commonwealth v. Fontes, 488 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Mass. 1986). 
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 750 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Mass. 2001) 
(“There was no error in denying the defendant’s request for the victim’s personnel 
records because those records were irrelevant. . . . Although the defendant here claimed 
self-defense, the defendant never placed before the judge either at trial or at the motion 
hearing any evidence that . . . the defendant was aware at the time of the incident of any 
acts of violence by the victim.”). 
10. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Mass. 1998). 
11. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005). 
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dispute.”12  Citing the “overwhelming trend toward admitting some 
form of this evidence,”13 the Adjutant court ultimately agreed with 
the majority view that such evidence is “properly admissible on the 
first aggressor issue, regardless whether the victim’s violent character 
was known to the defendant at the time of the assault.”14 
In the wake of Adjutant, reasonable allegations concerning an 
officer’s inappropriate use of force suddenly became relevant to a 
material issue in criminal proceedings, i.e., the identity of the first 
aggressor.15  To obtain access to such allegations, criminal defense 
attorneys across the state began filing motions for third-party 
records pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Proce­
dure.16  In response, the keepers of internal-affairs files frequently 
characterized these motions as “fishing expeditions for possibly rel­
evant information”17 and convinced many district and superior 
court judges to quash the subpoenas based on the absence of the 
“specific, good faith reason” first referenced in Commonwealth v. 
Wanis.18 
In an effort to bolster affidavits in support of motions for inter­
nal-affairs records, many defense lawyers resorted to public-records 
requests.19  In Massachusetts, there is a presumption that records in 
12. Id. at 3. 
13. Id. at 8. 
14. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
15. The evidence arguably becomes more relevant if the officer in question hap­
pens to be part of “a core group of officers who engage in violence or potentially vio­
lent action in a more repetitive concentrated way.”  Judith A.M. Scully, Rotten Apple or 
Rotten Barrel?: The Role of Civil Rights Lawyers in Ending the Culture of Police Vio­
lence, 21 NAT’L  BLACK L.J. 137, 141 (2009); see also id. at 140-41 & nn.17-19 (citing 
studies that show that incidents of police violence are not evenly distributed among 
officers throughout a department). 
16. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2); see also Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Be Furnished with Boston Police Department Records on Internal Investigations, in 
MASS. CONTINUING  LEGAL  EDUC., CRIMINAL  LAW: CONFERENCE 2008 73-78 (2008) 
(presenting sample opposition to defendant’s third-party record request). 
17. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418 (Mass. 2006). 
18. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Mass. 1998); see, e.g., Com­
monwealth v. Fisher-Levesque, No. 0723CR010191 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008) (Le­
roy, J.) (on file with authors) (order denying motion for internal-affairs records). But 
see Commonwealth v. Oyola, No. 0823CR005364 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2008) (Schu­
bert, J.) (on file with authors) (order allowing motion for internal-affairs records).  In 
response to the ruling allowing Mr. Oyola’s motion for internal-affairs records, the City 
of Springfield moved for and obtained a stay in order to pursue a petition pursuant to 
General Laws of Massachusetts chapter 211, section 3. Id.  However, before that peti­
tion could be filed, Mr. Oyola tendered a plea and was sentenced to time served. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Summons Internal 
Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertaining to Officer 
Shawn Crevier at 1, Commonwealth v. Lavalley, No. 0698CR3231 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 
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the possession of municipalities are public20 and should be disclosed 
within ten days of a request.21  Nevertheless, many municipalities 
maintained that certain statutory exemptions precluded the disclo­
sure of citizen complaints alleging excessive or unnecessary force.22 
Specifically, records custodians asserted that such complaints fell 
within the exemption for personnel file or information23 or were 
exempt under the “investigatory materials” exemption.24  In some 
instances, the same city law departments that denied public records 
requests on such grounds subsequently portrayed motions for third-
party records as fishing expeditions due to the inability of defense 
counsel to confirm the existence of records the city attorneys had 
previously refused to disclose.25 
The purpose of this Article is to advocate for the establishment 
of a protocol designed to give criminal defendants access to critical, 
exculpatory evidence in the possession of internal-affairs divisions 
of police departments.  The establishment of such a protocol repre­
sents a necessary response to the endemic problem of “cover 
charges” filed by police officers who physically abuse citizens, then 
misuse the criminal justice system to justify their misconduct.26 
27, 2007) (on file with authors) (discussing how public records request revealed thirty-
two pages of documents related to civilian complaints against arresting officer). See 
generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (2008). 
20. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(c). 
21. See id. § 10(b). 
22. See Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue Line: 
Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 34, 37 (“Police 
departments often react in a knee-jerk manner in denying public access to records of 
internal investigations concerning allegations of officer misconduct.”). 
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26(c). 
24. Id. § 7, cl. 26(f).  Notwithstanding a regulation prohibiting records custodians 
from inquiring into the purpose of a public-records request, municipalities have also 
denied requests on the ground that they were made by a criminal defendant, or his or 
her representative, in the context of a pending criminal case. 
25. Letter from Alesia H. Days, Associate City Solicitor, City of Springfield, to 
Luke Ryan (Dec. 4, 2008) (on file with authors) (stating internal-affairs division records 
“are not attainable by way of M.G.L. c. 66 §10”); City of Springfield’s Response to 
Darry Berrocales’s Petition to the Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court Pursu­
ant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, Berrocales v. City of Springfield, No. SJ-2009-0079 (Mar. 9, 2009) 
(on file with authors). 
26. See Sarah Hughes Newman, Comment, Proving Probable Cause: Allocating 
the Burden of Proof in False Arrest Claims Under § 1983, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 347, 371 
(2006) (citing “[s]tudies of police practices in Philadelphia and New York [that] found 
that false charges by police were pervasive and were frequently used to cover street 
abuse”); see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 736 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) 
(recognizing that “[i]f brutality had occurred,” the police “would have had a motive to 
cover up the beating to protect themselves or their fellow officers”); Newman, supra, at 
371 n.164 (“[T]he police review board found that it was standard practice to lodge a 
78 
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This problem is compounded by what has been called the “Blue 
Wall of Silence”—an unwritten code of loyalty that compels “all 
officers on a ‘scene’ . . . , if called upon, [to] recite identical versions 
of what happened . . . [and] support the authoritative version of 
events that contends that no brutality occurred.”27 
Part One offers a brief history of police brutality and the role 
the Blue Wall of Silence has played in perpetuating it.  Part Two 
provides a synopsis of the law of self-defense, as well as the evolu­
tion of the SJC’s attitude toward the use of propensity evidence in 
such cases.  Part Three gives an overview of the Commonwealth’s 
version of the Freedom of Information Act before focusing on its 
construction in cases involving records in the custody of police de­
partments.  Part Four concerns the procedural hurdles criminal de­
fendants have had to overcome to obtain records from third parties. 
Part Five highlights the drastically different ways municipalities in 
Massachusetts respond to requests for citizen complaints against 
police officers.  Part Six reviews the way courts in other jurisdic­
tions deal with requests for documentation concerning police mis­
conduct in self-defense cases.  Finally, Part Seven presents a 
proposal that we believe is sensitive to the legitimate concerns of 
courts, record keepers, and law enforcement, while simultaneously 
safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants. 
Ultimately, the authors hope to show that permitting access to 
an officer’s track record of abuse will not only serve the interest of 
the particular defendant on trial, but will also promote police integ­
rity by causing officers to think twice before engaging in indefen­
sible behavior.  This, in turn, will leave the public with greater 
confidence in the police who patrol their streets.28 
charge of resisting arrest or disorderly conduct against anyone who accused the police 
of brutality.” (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE F. COLE, THE AMERICAN SYS­
TEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 255 (4th ed. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
27. Christopher Cooper, Yes Virginia, There Is a Police Code of Silence: Prosecut­
ing Police Officers and the Police Subculture, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 277, 280 (2009).  The 
Blue Wall of Silence has been called “the greatest single barrier to the effective investi­
gation and adjudication of complaints against” police officers.  Chin & Wells, supra 
note 5, at 240. R 
28. As one scholar recently noted, “[P]erceptions of legitimacy play a critical role 
in inducing compliance with the law, and conversely, . . . perceptions of illegitimacy 
induce non-compliance.”  I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy & Testilying, 83 IND. 
L.J. 835, 837 (2008). 
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I. POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE BLUE WALL OF SILENCE 
A. A Short History of Police Brutality29 
“Police brutality is not a new phenomenon in American soci­
ety.”30  In fact, along with the formation of the first organized po­
lice forces in the middle of the Nineteenth Century came the first 
cases of police misconduct.31  By the end of the century, “[p]olice 
brutality, corruption and abuse of authority” had begun to present 
“American cities with some of their most pressing—and legally vex­
ing—social problems.”32 
The first in-depth examination of police misconduct occurred 
during the Hoover Administration under the auspices of the Na­
tional Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.33  Com­
monly known as the Wickersham Commission after its chairperson, 
George W. Wickersham, the group published fourteen papers in 
June of 1930, including a “Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforce­
ment.”34  “In uncompromising language,” the Wickersham Com­
mission “concluded that ‘[t]he third degree—that is, the use of 
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary 
29. According to one commentator, 
Police brutality is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith 
with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target.  It is described as 
“conscious and venal, . . . directed against persons of marginal status and 
credibility,” and “committed by officers who [usually] take great pains to 
conceal their [mis]conduct.” 
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
1275, 1276 (1999) (omission in original) (quoting JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. 
FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (1993)). 
30. Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUF­
FOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (noting that “[p]olice abuses” date back to “the early 
history of our nation”); see also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall 
of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 
219-21 (2000). 
31. David S. Cohen, Note, Official Oppression: A Historical Analysis of Low-
Level Police Abuse and a Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
165, 175 (1996); see also MARILYNN JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE 
VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 12-29 (2003). 
32. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in 
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2000); see also JOHNSON, 
supra note 31, at 3 (citing “the routine bludgeoning of citizens by patrolmen armed with R 
nightsticks or blackjacks”). 
33. Samuel Walker, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION 
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART I: RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
OFFICIAL LAWLESSNESS, at v (1997), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/ 
academics/upa_cis/1965_WickershamCommPt1.pdf. 
34. Id. 
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confessions or admissions—is widespread.’”35  Although this con­
troversial report led to the establishment of the first internal-affairs 
bureaus,36 public scrutiny of police brutality did not occur until the 
1960s.37 
During this decade, “widespread police brutality sparked a se­
ries of urban riots, leading the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to 
declare that ‘police brutality in the United States . . . is a serious 
and continuing problem.’”38  Due to “[a]dvances in technology and 
more critical media coverage,” many citizens got their first glimpse 
of “police officers using excessive force on individuals engaged in 
peaceful demonstrations.”39  By the end of the decade, some began 
to feel that “[t]he beating of blacks and other targeted groups was 
not an anomaly, but a norm of American life.”40  “Still, bad habits 
die slowly.”41  During the next two decades, credible allegations of 
police brutality made headlines in cities across the country.42 
In 1991, the beating of Rodney King by four Los Angeles po­
lice officers placed an unprecedented focus on the issue of police 
brutality.43  “A few years later, the Ramparts police scandal gave 
the LAPD yet another black eye in terms of police conduct, exces­
sive use of force, and related civil rights violations.”44 
In 1992, New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins established a 
temporary commission to investigate police corruption.45  Among 
other things, the investigation revealed 
that in contemporary policing, corruption and brutality were 
often linked.  The Commission found that brutality was, at times, 
an introduction and, at others, a companion to narcotics corrup­
35. Id. at ix (quoting NAT’L  COMM’N ON  LAW  OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931)). 
36. Id. at x. 
37. Levenson, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that this era featured a close examina- R 
tion by many Americans of all their “public institutions”). 
38. Gilles, supra note 32, at 18. R 
39. Levenson, supra note 30, at 7. R 
40. See id. 
41. Id. at 8 (describing the death of a Texas inmate who allegedly committed 
suicide in a county jail but whose autopsy revealed injuries in places where they could 
not have been self-inflicted). 
42. See id. 
43. Gilles, supra note 32, at 18. R 
44. Karen R. Smith, Crime, Punishment and the Central District, 36 SW. U. L. 
REV. 323, 336-37 (2007). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of 
the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2001). 
45. Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: 
An Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 73, 74 (1995). 
81 
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tion. . . . Police officers told the Commission during private inter­
views and public hearings that they were initiated into the world 
of corruption by committing acts of brutality.  Acts of violence 
against suspects and prisoners were used as a barometer to prove 
an officer was a tough cop who could be trusted and accepted by 
fellow officers.46 
In May 2000, the United States Department of Justice pub­
lished a report on police attitudes toward abuse of authority; over 
900 officers were surveyed, randomly chosen from 121 depart­
ments.47  The survey revealed that more than one-fifth of police of­
ficers felt fellow officers sometimes, often, or always used more 
force than necessary.48  This finding was consistent with a previous 
study conducted in Illinois where twenty percent of police respon­
dents acknowledged observing other officers using “considerably 
more force than necessary.”49 
“In April 2001, the city of Cincinnati experienced a riot remi­
niscent of the 1960s: an outburst of African American rage follow­
ing the fifteenth fatal shooting of a young black man by the 
Cincinnati Police Department in six years.”50  The following year, 
state and local law enforcement agencies with 100 or more sworn 
officers received 26,556 complaints regarding the inappropriate or 
excessive use of force.51  Approximately 2000 of these complaints 
“were sustained, meaning there was sufficient evidence of the alle­
gation to justify disciplinary action against the subject officer(s).”52 
46. Id. at 77 (citations omitted); see also David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the 
Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481-82 (1992) (“Studies of 
excessive use of force point out that a predictable catalyst to abuse is the officers’ per­
ception that their authority is being questioned or defied.  Even verbal questioning of 
authority leads many police officers to believe that their power and position have been 
threatened.” (citation omitted)). 
47. Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & 
URB. POL’Y 74, 79 (2005). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 3 
(2003) (citation omitted). 
51. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT 
POLICE USE OF FORCE 1-2 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
ccpuf.pdf. 
52. Id. at 1; see also Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring 
Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496 (2008).  The fact that 2000 complaints were 
substantiated is significant in light of the persistent criticism that “internal disciplinary 
bodies . . . often fail to take complaints seriously, conduct a reasonable, thorough or 
impartial investigation or effectively recommend discipline for officers responsible for 
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B. The Blue Wall of Silence 
“The existence of some form of a police code of silence in 
many police departments across the nation is well documented in 
court opinions, scholarly literature, news reports, and police investi­
gatory commission reports examining the subject.”53  At its core, 
the code “consists of one simple rule—an officer does not provide 
adverse information against a fellow officer.”54 
While it is impossible to quantify the extent of the code’s im­
pact within a particular department, studies indicate that “[s]ome 
form of a Code of Silence will develop among officers in virtually 
any agency” and efforts to uproot it altogether “will be futile.”55 
One such study conducted by the National Institute of Ethics be­
tween February 1999 and June 2000 utilized confidential question­
naire and interview responses by 1157 officers and 1016 academy 
recruits from across the country.56  Seventy-nine percent of the 
academy recruits surveyed said that “a law enforcement Code of 
Silence exists and is fairly common throughout the nation.”57  Over 
half these recruits reported that the existence of the code “doesn’t 
really bother them,” and nearly one quarter maintained that the 
code actually had a positive role to play in cases where an officer 
employed excessive force against an unruly suspect.58 
Ultimately, the National Institute of Ethics concluded that the 
code of silence is triggered more frequently “by excessive use of 
force incidents . . . than [by] any other specific circumstance.”59  In 
short, this study lends credence to the claim that the code permits 
“violent officers to feel comfortable that their actions will never be 
discovered and that they will not suffer retribution from brutal­
ity.”60  As one former New York City police officer once put it, 
human rights violations.”  Andrea J. Ritchie & Joey L. Mogul, In the Shadows of the 
War on Terror: Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United 
States, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 175, 237 (2008) (observing that complaints are fre­
quently “found to be unsubstantiated based on the mere fact that the officer involved 
denies that any violation took place”). 
53. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 237-40 (citations omitted). R 
54. Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 575. R 
55. NEAL TRAUTMAN, NAT’L INST. OF ETHICS, POLICE CODE OF SILENCE FACTS 
REVEALED, http://www.aele.org/loscode2000.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Myriam Gilles, Keeping Quiet, Covering Up and Never, Ever Ratting: The Ef­
fects of the Code of Silence on Reforming Police Culture, GEO. U. L. CENTER CONTINU­
ING LEGAL EDUC., Apr. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 22002097, at *7; see also Koepke, supra note 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-MAY-10 16:10 
2010] ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS 83 
“[T]he police code of silence is stronger than the mafia’s code of 
omerta.”61 
To understand the origins of the code of silence requires a 
close look at the nature of police work.  According to two commen­
tators, “The experience of danger and authority may contribute to 
the creation of a police code of silence.”62  In his analysis of the Los 
Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry report on the Ram­
part Scandal, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky offered this explana­
tion for the role silence plays in police departments: 
Silence offers cover to officers who abuse the public, lie, and oth­
erwise break the law.  Silence cements the bond of trust between 
partners whose mutual dependence feels like the best protection 
in a job where one wrong move can mean death.  Silence seems 
necessary to officers who view themselves at war with crime, 
criminals, and an anti-cop community.  Silence is easier than tan­
gling with fellow cops.63 
Here, in Massachusetts, perhaps no case better illustrates the 
way in which the code of silence exacerbates the problem of police 
brutality than the 1995 beating of a black, undercover Boston Police 
Officer named Michael Cox.  While in pursuit of a suspect, Cox at­
tempted to climb over a fence when he felt a blow to the back of 
the head that “rocked his brain, causing it to collide with the inside 
of his skull.”64  Additional blows followed until Cox managed to 
30, at 213-14 (“Because of the Blue Wall of Silence, police brutality and police perjury R 
have been, and continue to be, protected and facilitated by the police culture.”). 
61. Cohen, supra note 31, at 192 n.123 (citation omitted). R 
62. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 251 (citations and internal quotation marks R 
omitted).  Specifically, Chin and Wells theorize that 
[t]he combination of the two creates a volatile environment in which the police 
may develop values at odds with those of the larger society.  As these features 
of the police role are incorporated into officers’ underlying values and ideals, 
the end result may be a cultural matrix which entails a banding together, a 
cover-up, a conspiracy of silence.  This facet of police culture, at least in the 
eyes of the culture’s members, provides protection.  Such a close-knit camara­
derie becomes the foundation for personal security in a hazardous, and even 
life-threatening day-to-day line of work, where officers rely upon their com­
panions for protection.  Even otherwise honest officers, in the face of an­
other’s misconduct, may look the other way due to the enormous pressure to 
maintain silence, and may even commit perjury in an attempt to conceal the 
misconduct from courts, prosecutors, and the public. 
Id. 
63. Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 574. R 
64. DICK  LEHR, THE  FENCE: A POLICE  COVER-UP  ALONG  BOSTON’S  RACIAL 
DIVIDE 133-34 (2009). 
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find and flash his badge.65  Once the officers administering the beat­
ing realized that their victim was in fact another officer, the code of 
silence took over.66  Boston Police Chief Paul Evans would later 
chalk up the futility of a four-year internal affairs investigation to 
the absence of officers willing to cooperate.67 
II. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE 
In cases where a suspect has been injured as a result of his or 
her encounter with the police, fact-finders inevitably hear testimony 
that the officers involved in the arrest used only such force as was 
necessary or that the injuries suffered by the suspect were self-
inflicted.  According to Professor Alan Dershowitz, “such boiler­
plate police testimony” tends to unfold accordingly: 
We attempted to place the perpetrator under arrest, . . . but 
he began to swing wildly at the officers.  I tried to place him in 
handcuffs, . . . but he started to reach into his jacket for what I 
believed to be a weapon.  When I grabbed his hands in order to 
prevent him from reaching for a weapon, he began to kick in 
every direction, hitting his legs against the side of the police car 
and other hard objects. 
At this point, he fell to the ground and started to bang his 
head and body against the pavement.  We attempted to subdue 
him because we were concerned that he would hurt himself.  He 
was strong and it took us several minutes to subdue him . . . . All 
of his injuries, and ours as well, were sustained as a result of his 
resistance and our efforts to subdue him.68 
In Massachusetts, these kinds of allegations typically serve as 
the factual bases for charges of disorderly conduct,69 assault and 
battery on a police officer,70 and resisting arrest.71  While an asser­
tion of self-defense has always been available to Massachusetts de­
fendants facing such charges, the following section will illustrate 
65. Id. at 135. 
66. See id. at 145-47. 
67. John Joseph Powers, Jr., Note, Eroding the Blue Wall of Silence: The Need for 
an Internal Affairs Privilege of Confidentiality, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 19, 
28 (2000) (noting “that three of the officers implicated in the Cox beating had nine 
prior misconduct complaints filed against them”). 
68. Chin & Wells, supra note 5, at 254 (omissions in original) (quoting Alan Der- R 
showitz, A Police Badge is Not a License to Commit Perjury, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Apr. 4, 1991, at B11). 
69. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (2008). 
70. Id. ch. 265, § 13D. 
71. Id. ch. 268, § 32B. 
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why evidence of an officer’s history of violence has rarely found its 
way into the hands of defense counsel or been presented to fact-
finders. 
A. Brief Overview of Self-Defense in General 
The Commonwealth has a longstanding tradition of upholding 
the right of citizens to use force to protect themselves from harm. 
“That a man may defend his person, his lands, or goods, against the 
intrusion or invasion of those who have no lawful authority over 
them, would seem entirely unquestionable.”72  Self-defense is appli­
cable to a wide range of actions; however, much of the case law has 
developed in homicide prosecutions.73 
In order to use deadly force to repel an attacker, a person must 
have “availed himself of all reasonable and proper means in the 
circumstance to avoid combat.”74  This right is also limited to the 
defendant who has “reasonable ground to believe and actually did 
believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
harm, from which he could save himself only by using deadly 
force.”75  “The right of self-defence arises from necessity, and ends 
when the necessity ends.”76  Finally, a person may use “no more 
force [than] was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances of the 
case.”77 
Ultimately, whether self-defense was warranted and, if so, how 
much force was permissible are questions of fact.78  The fact-finder 
considers the physical capabilities of the combatants, the steps 
taken to avoid the confrontation, and the type of weapons used.79 
Attention is also given to the location of the events, particularly 
whether the incident occurred in the defendant’s home.80  “Massa­
72. Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 133, 137 (1829). 
73. 32 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, MASSACHUSETTS  PRACTICE 
SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW § 679, at 703-04 (3d ed. 2001). 
74. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975), superseded by 
statute, An Act Permitting the Killing or Injuring of a Person Unlawfully in a Dwelling, 
ch. 696, 1981 Mass. Acts 1020.  While a person must exhaust all possible means of re­
treat, there is no absolute duty to retreat where it would put a person in further danger. 
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 957 (Mass. 1998). 
75. Commonwealth v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1980). 
76. Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 1966). 
77. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d at 479. 
78. Id. at 511. 
79. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d at 414. 
80. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975), superseded by 
statute, An Act Permitting the Killing or Injuring of a Person Unlawfully in a Dwelling, 
ch. 696, 1981 Mass. Acts 1020. 
86 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 14  4-MAY-10 16:10 
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:73 
chusetts has long followed the evidentiary rule that permits the in­
troduction of evidence of the victim’s violent character, if known to 
the defendant, as it bears on the defendant’s state of mind and the 
reasonableness of his actions in claiming to have acted in self­
defense.”81 
B. The Use of Self-Defense to Resist an Excessive Force Arrest 
One of the earlier cases in the Commonwealth to address the 
right of self-defense was based on whether a private citizen had the 
right to defend himself from the potentially unlawful actions of a 
police officer in seizing contested property.82  The law continues to 
grapple with assertions of self-defense in response to allegations of 
excessive force on the part of an arresting officer. 
For example, Robert Graham was severely beaten by police 
officers in May of 1998.83  This caused him to fear the police and 
potential future assaults.84  “[H]ospital records admitted in evi­
dence corroborated his testimony as to the events of 1998 and es­
tablished that he had suffered severe injuries (including a skull 
fracture, internal bleeding, broken teeth, and various other frac­
tures, lacerations, and abrasions) that required a lengthy hospitali­
zation.”85  Sixteen months later, Graham saw sirens approaching his 
location and said that he attempted to gain unlawful entry into an 
apartment building from the fire escape in order to hide from the 
police.86  The officers, responding to a citizen’s report of a possible 
breaking and entering in progress, found him on the fire escape and 
ordered him to stop.87  Graham fled, entered a nearby apartment 
building through a skylight, and hid under a bed.88  The officers 
contacted the owner and searched the home.89  The homeowner 
also conducted a search and noticed some belongings moved from 
under a bed.90  The homeowner looked under the bed, saw a man 
“curled up in a fetal position” with his head facing the wall, and 
notified the officers.91 
81. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005). 
82. Commonwealth v. Kennard, 25 Mass. (8 Pick) 133, 136 (1829). 
83. Commonwealth v. Graham, 818 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
84. Id. at 1075. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1073. 
87. Id. at 1072. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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All of the officers on the scene told the same story of Graham 
violently charging at them when the mattress was lifted.92  “At­
tempts to spray the defendant with mace did not subdue him, and 
Officer Charbonnier, who weighed 220 pounds, held onto the de­
fendant, but lost control of him.”93  The officers tackled Graham in 
the hallway and handcuffed him.94 
Graham testified that the mattress was thrown back and he 
faced an officer with a gun pointed at his head.95 
Officer Charbonnier grabbed him from behind and was choking 
him with his flashlight, so that he could barely breathe, while an­
other officer, possibly Officer Foley, hit him so hard in the face 
his front teeth were knocked out.  He also was being kicked in 
the ribs to get him down, and when he was on the floor an officer 
had a foot on his head, and smashed his head into the floor. 
Throughout this time, the defendant thought he might be killed 
by the police.96 
Graham lost consciousness and spent three days in the hospi­
tal.97  Evidence showed a considerable amount of blood in the bed­
room where he was discovered and in an adjacent hallway.98 
Graham appealed his convictions for assault and battery 
against a police officer and resisting arrest.99  The appeals court re­
versed the convictions and discussed the use of self-defense during 
an arrest where excessive force is alleged.100  It held that the right 
to resist the use of a police officer’s excessive force is rooted in the 
same doctrine as self-defense.101 
A defendant has a right to a jury instruction on self-defense if 
there is sufficient evidence for the claim.102  “In determining 
whether sufficient evidence of self-defense exists, all reasonable in­
ferences should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and, no mat­
ter how incredible his testimony, that testimony must be treated as 
true.”103  The burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to show be­
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1076. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1071. 
100. Id. at 1075-79. 
101. Id. at 1075 n.6. 
102. Commonwealth v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1980). 
103. Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 955 (Mass. 1998). 
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yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not use self­
defense.104  In the context of either a lawful or unlawful arrest, a 
defendant cannot use reasonable force to defend himself unless the 
police officer uses excessive force.105  Both issues of excessive force 
on the part of the police officer and reasonable force in self-defense 
are questions for the fact-finder.106 
C. Evidence of Self-Defense in Massachusetts 
Historically, a defendant could only introduce evidence of a 
victim’s violent past if the defendant was aware of that past at the 
time of the encounter.107  Under this rule, defendants had no right 
to access prior complaints about an officer’s use of excessive force 
pursuant to Wanis, unless they happened to know about the of­
ficer’s propensity for violence at the time of their encounter.108 
Then, in 2005, the SJC decided Commonwealth v. Adjutant.109 
This decision altered the evidentiary landscape in self-defense cases 
by entrusting trial judges with “the discretion to admit in evidence 
specific incidents of violence that the victim is reasonably alleged to 
have initiated” to show that the victim was the first aggressor.110 
The facts in Adjutant were compelling.  Rhonda Adjutant was 
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter in the death of Stephen 
Whiting.111  Adjutant worked for an escort service and accepted an 
assignment to go to Whiting’s apartment.112  When she arrived 
there, Adjutant telephoned her employer to confirm that she was in 
the apartment and received payment.113  During this call, Whiting 
snorted two lines of cocaine.114  When Adjutant offered to begin a 
massage, Whiting indicated that he expected intercourse.115  Adju­
104. Graham, 818 N.E.2d at 1077. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005). 
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 750 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Mass. 2001) 
(“There was no error in denying the defendant’s request for the victim’s personnel 
records because those records were irrelevant . . . . Although the defendant here 
claimed self-defense, the defendant never placed before the judge either at trial or at 
the motion hearing any evidence that . . . the defendant was aware at the time of the 
incident of any acts of violence by the victim.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
109. 824 N.E.2d 1. 
110. Id. at 3. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 3-4. 
113. Id. at 4. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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tant called the escort agency again to tell the dispatcher of Whit­
ing’s demands and then handed the telephone to Whiting.116  The 
dispatcher attempted to explain that intercourse was not part of the 
original agreement.117  Whiting requested a refund but neither Ad­
jutant nor the dispatcher would comply.118  The dispatcher told Ad­
jutant to leave the apartment and stayed on the telephone while she 
began to leave.119 
According to Adjutant, “when she attempted to leave, Whiting 
pushed her onto his bed and retrieved a crowbar from the kitchen, 
at which point Adjutant picked up a knife that was lying on the 
bedside table.”120  While still on the phone with Adjutant, the dis­
patcher requested that the company driver return to pick her up.121 
Whiting came towards her swinging the crowbar, making contact 
with a countertop and then Adjutant’s leg.122  She nicked his face 
with the knife and started to run to the door but Whiting tackled 
her.123  Adjutant then stabbed Whiting in the shoulder but he con­
tinued to block her access to the door.124  When the drivers arrived 
at the apartment, they heard Adjutant screaming and kicked in the 
door.125  Adjutant testified that when the door swung open Whiting 
continued to advance toward her with the crowbar and she stabbed 
him in the neck.126 
The main question for the jury was “whether Adjutant acted in 
self-defense.”127  Adjutant’s attorney wanted to introduce evidence 
of Whiting’s reputation for violence as well as certain violent acts 
that he committed while intoxicated.128  The medical examiner con­
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  Other witnesses offered conflicting testimony as to the sequence of 
events that lead to Whiting’s death. See id.  As previously noted, “all reasonable infer­
ences should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and, no matter how incredible his 
testimony, that testimony must be treated as true.”  Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 
951, 955 (Mass. 1998). 
121. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 4. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.  The defense had evidence of an event less than a year prior to his death 
in which Whiting was attacked in his own apartment by two armed, masked men.  Whit­
ing believed that one of the men was his dealer who saw that Whiting had a substantial 
amount of money in his apartment. Id.  When the men demanded the money, Whiting 
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firmed that Whiting had cocaine in his system and an elevated 
blood alcohol level.129  Two of Whiting’s neighbors testified that 
they saw Whiting make sexual advances toward two women in the 
neighborhood on the night of his death and that he appeared intoxi­
cated.130  However, the defense was barred from cross-examining 
these witnesses regarding Whiting’s reputation for violence or prior 
violent acts, as these were unknown to Adjutant at the time of the 
fatal encounter.131  Even after the prosecutor introduced evidence 
of Whiting’s calm disposition, the defense was not allowed to im­
peach this testimony with Whiting’s reputation or prior acts of ag­
gression.132  The appeals court affirmed the conviction.133  The SJC 
reversed and remanded with Justice Cowin dissenting.134 
To reach its ultimate conclusion, the court discussed the two 
possible ways to use propensity evidence to further a claim of self-
defense.  Such evidence may either be employed to (1) show “that 
at the time of the assault the defendant was reasonably apprehen­
sive for his safety, and used a degree of force that was reasonable in 
light of the victim’s violent tendencies” or (2) “prove that the victim 
and not the defendant was likely to have been the ‘first aggres­
sor.’”135  As Justice Cordy explained, “Under the first theory, the 
evidence is not admitted for the purpose of showing that the victim 
acted in conformance with his character for violence; under the sec­
ond theory, it is.”136  Prior to Adjutant, the SJC had not had occa­
sion to rule on the admissibility of evidence offered solely for the 
purpose of the second theory.137 
The Adjutant court ultimately found that allowing evidence of 
the victim’s violent character has probative value and could help 
attacked them with a crowbar. Id.  He did not back down despite being outnumbered 
and outmatched. Id.  The men stole the money and left Whiting near death. Id.  Whit­
ing contacted the police and gave grand jury testimony. Id. 
129. Id. at 5. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.  During Adjutant’s sentencing hearing, one neighbor testified that he 
confronted Whiting about damage to a common yard. Id. at 5 n.4.  Whiting, who was 
allegedly on cocaine, “chased after his neighbor ‘like a raging bull.’” Id.  Two other 
neighbors were allegedly threatened with a butcher knife and a friend was allegedly 
doused with boiling water after arguing with Whiting. Id. 
132. Id. at 5 (omission in original). 
133. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 800 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (unpub­
lished table decision), rev’d, 824 N.E.2d 1. 
134. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d at 15. 
135. Id. at 6. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
91 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 19  4-MAY-10 16:10 
2010] ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
the jury decide who was the first aggressor when the facts were in 
dispute.138  Surveying the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, 
the court found it persuasive that all federal courts and forty-five 
state appellate courts had adopted the rule “that some form of such 
evidence is properly admissible on the first aggressor issue, regard­
less whether the victim’s violent character was known to the defen­
dant at the time of the assault.”139 
Once the court decided that evidence should be admitted to 
show the victim’s violent character, a question of form remained.140 
Adjutant argued that specific acts of violence perpetrated by Whit­
ing, as well as his reputation for violence, should be admitted at her 
retrial.141  On this point, the SJC disagreed and refused to admit 
reputation evidence.142  According to the court, “Reputations or 
opinions are often formed based on rumor or other unreliable hear­
say sources, without any personal knowledge on the part of the per­
son holding that opinion.”143  In contrast, “evidence of specific 
instances of conduct is the most convincing.”144  The new rule al­
lows a defendant to introduce “evidence of specific acts of prior 
violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to have initi­
ated, to support [a] claim of self-defense.”145 
Prior to adopting this rule, the court considered the following 
five arguments against admitting evidence of a victim’s propensity 
for violence: 
(1) the danger of ascribing character traits to a victim with proof 
of isolated incidents, (2) the worry that jurors will be invited to 
acquit the defendant on the improper ground that the victim de­
served to die, (3) the potential for wasting time trying collateral 
questions surrounding the victim’s past conduct, (4) the unfair 
difficulty of rebuttal by the prosecution, and (5) the strategic im­
138. Id. at 8. 
139. Id. at 7.  The court noted that is also the standard set forth in Rules 404 and 
405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 6. 
140. Id. at 10-11. 
141. Id. at 11. 
142. See id. at 13-14.  In taking this position, the court acknowledged that Massa­
chusetts would continue to be something of an anomaly since “[a]ll other State jurisdic­
tions that admit character evidence in these circumstances admit reputation evidence.” 
Id. at 11. 
143. Id. at 13. 
144. Id. at 11 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
145. Id. at 13. 
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balance that flows from the inability of prosecutors to introduce 
similar evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts.146 
In rejecting these arguments, the majority placed its faith in the 
ability of trial judges to “‘weigh[ ] the probative value of evidence 
against any prejudicial effect it might have on a jury.’”147  Ulti­
mately, the Adjutant court gave trial judges the discretion to admit 
so much of a defendant’s proffered evidence as is “noncumulative 
and relevant to the defendant’s self-defense claim.”148 
In 2007, Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson refined the rule ini­
tially set forth in Adjutant.149  While the conflict in Adjutant was 
between two people, the physical altercation in Pring-Wilson in­
volved three.150  The victim’s friend, Samuel Rodriguez, was also a 
party to the dispute and may have been the initial aggressor.151 
“Because Rodriguez played a central role in the fight . . . and be­
cause the purpose of the Adjutant rule is to give the jury a full pic­
ture of the altercation so as to make an informed decision about the 
identity of the initial aggressor or aggressors,” Pring-Wilson held 
that some evidence of Rodriguez’s history of violence should have 
been admitted.152  In keeping with the rationale of Adjutant, the 
court again noted the key role of the trial judge to use discretion in 
admitting only relevant evidence.153 
146. Id. at 11.  Justice Cowin’s dissent voiced similar concerns that this type of 
evidence, “unknown to a defendant, do[es] little to help a jury resolve the issue whether 
a defendant was the first aggressor.” Id. at 15 (Cowin, J., dissenting). 
147. Id. at 12 (majority opinion) (quoting Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 810 N.E.2d 
1201, 1210 (Mass. 2004)). 
148. Id. at 13.  Trial judges also have the ability to instruct the jury on the purpose 
of the evidence in order to help the jury decide the question of who was the first aggres­
sor and avoid clogging the process with collateral issues. Id. 
149. Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (Mass. 2007).  When 
the court decided Adjutant, it held that the new rule it announced would only be ap­
plied prospectively with an exception made for Rhonda Adjutant. Adjudant, 824 
N.E.2d at 15.  At that time, Pring-Wilson had already been convicted of voluntary man­
slaughter and sentenced, but his appeal was pending. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d at 938­
39.  His application for a new trial was granted based upon the fact that the identity of 
the first aggressor was integral to his self-defense claim, and the trial judge repeatedly 
denied his requests to present evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts. Id. at 939. 
The SJC determined that the judge’s decision to grant a new trial was not an abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 947. 
150. Pring-Wilson, 863 N.E.2d at 950. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 951. 
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In the wake of Adjutant, Pring-Wilson, and their progeny,154 
citizen complainants who had previously alleged physical aggres­
sion on the part of police officers suddenly became potential wit­
nesses capable of corroborating claims that the very same officers 
also assaulted the defendants on trial.155  To obtain access to the 
identity of these complainants, defense counsel began pursuing cop­
ies of their complaints by way of public records requests.156 
III. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW 
Though the release of certain public records was required as 
early as the Nineteenth Century, “the modern Massachusetts Public 
Records Law” was not codified until 1973.157  Modeled on the fed­
eral Freedom of Information Act,158 the law defines “[p]ublic 
records” to include 
books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial 
statements, statistical tabulations, or other documentary materi­
als or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or 
received by any officer or employee of any agency, executive of­
fice, department, board, commission, bureau, division or author­
ity of the commonwealth, or of any political subdivision 
thereof.159 
154. In 2008, the appeals court clarified that the new rule announced in Adjutant 
does not just apply in homicide cases.  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 895 N.E.2d 758, 761 
n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). 
155. While it appears statistically unlikely that many of these complainants were 
sustained, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, Adjutant permits the introduc- R 
tion of “specific acts of prior violent conduct that the victim is reasonably alleged to 
have initiated.”  Commonwealth v. Adjudant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Mass. 2005) (emphasis 
added).  In other words, a determination by an internal-affairs division that the officer 
in question was the first aggressor is not a prerequisite to admitting testimony about the 
incident from the complainant. See id. 
156. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Summons Inter­
nal Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertaining to Officer 
Shawn Crevier, supra note 19, at 1 (“Through a public records request, thirty-two pages R 
of documents related to civilian complaints against Officer Crevier have been made 
available to the defendant by the Ware Police Department.”). 
157. REBECCA S. MURRAY, FREEDOM OF  INFORMATION AND  PUBLIC  RECORDS 
LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 4-5 (2009). 
158. See id.  One significant difference between the federal and state laws is that 
while the former includes “specific exemptions from disclosure for confidential law en­
forcement sources, such statutory language is absent from the Massachusetts public 
records law.”  Powers, supra note 67, at 21. R 
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (2008). 
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Excluded from this “broad definition of the term ‘public 
records’”160 are twelve categories of information.161  These exemp­
tions are “strictly construed” in light of a “statutory presumption in 
favor of disclosure,”162 and it is the record custodian’s burden to 
show that a record comes within the purview of a particular statu­
tory exemption.163 
A public record request begins “with a reasonable description 
of the desired information” delivered either by mail, email, facsim­
ile, or in person.164  The custodian has up to ten calendar days to 
provide the requested documents or a written explanation as to the 
basis of a denial.165  The custodian is prohibited from inquiring into 
the purpose of the request.166  If the custodian denies the record 
request or fails to respond within ten days, the requestor has a right 
to appeal to the Supervisor of Records (“the Supervisor”).167  The 
custodian has a duty to advise the requestor of this remedy.168 
As the following discussion will make clear, the trend in Mas­
sachusetts is “toward more public disclosure of police documents in 
an effort to restrict the abuse of power by police officers.”169  Ac­
cordingly, an argument can be made that citizen complaints, or at 
least portions of them, should be disclosed upon request. 
A. Bougas v. Chief of Police170 
In Bougas, three individuals were charged with misdemeanors 
after the police arrived to disperse a gathering at a home in Lexing­
ton.171  As a result of the incident, numerous police reports were 
160. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm’r, 648 N.E.2d 419, 424 n.9 (Mass. 
1995). 
161. Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 731 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Mass. 2000). 
162. Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm’r, 404 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Mass. 1980). 
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(c). 
164. SEC’Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH, DIV. OF PUB. RECORDS, A GUIDE TO THE 
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW 6 (2009) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO THE MASSA­
CHUSETTS  PUBLIC  RECORDS  LAW], available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/ 
guide.pdf. 
165. Id.  As will be discussed, the statutory exemptions most frequently cited by 
internal-affairs divisions are the privacy and investigatory exemptions. 
166. Id. at 7.  While the custodians are allowed to charge reasonable fees for col­
lecting and delivering the records, the regulations encourage record keepers to waive 
the fee when it is in the public’s best interest. Id. 
167. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.08 (2003). 
168. Id.  The requestor also has the right to bring a civil action in superior court 
or directly before the SJC. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(b). 
169. Powers, supra note 67, at 20. R 
170. 354 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1976). 
171. Id. at 875. 
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generated, and the police chief received several letters from private 
citizens.172  After portions of a couple police reports were printed in 
the local paper, one of the defense attorneys filed a public records 
request in the hopes of obtaining these and other records related to 
the incident.173  When the request was denied, defense counsel filed 
suit.174  A superior court judge ruled in favor of the police chief and 
found that the records in question fell under the “investigatory 
materials” exemption.175  The SJC affirmed.176 
According to the SJC, the investigatory exemption served four 
salutary purposes.  First, it prevented the “premature disclosure of 
the Commonwealth’s case prior to trial.”177  Second, it guarded 
against “the disclosure of confidential investigative techniques, pro­
cedures, or sources of information.”178  Third, the exemption en­
couraged “individual citizens to come forward and speak freely 
with police concerning matters under investigation.”179  Finally, it 
facilitated complete candor on the part of police officers when “re­
cording their observations, hypotheses and interim conclusions.”180 
In the case before it, the court concluded that the disclosure of 
the investigatory materials at issue would “detract from effective 
law enforcement to such a degree as to operate in derogation, and 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 876. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.  According to two commentators, “A number of courts have questioned 
the unsupported assertion that subjecting such witness statements . . . (whether from 
civilians or uniformed officers) to public disclosure will necessarily inhibit, or chill, the 
full, frank, and accurate recounting of recollections or observations of key events.” 
Zansberg & Campos, supra note 22, at 36.  As one Colorado court put it, “[T]he pro- R 
position that knowledge on the part of individual police officers that the information 
they provide to [internal-affairs] investigators will later be subject to disclosure . . . will 
have a detrimental effect on frank and open communication . . . [and] should be subject 
to careful scrutiny.”  Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Colo. 1980).  An­
other federal judge noted that “the alternative . . . [i.e.,] some possibility of disclosure,” 
could more likely incite candor: 
In short, officers will feel pressure to be honest and logical when they know
 
that their statements and their work product will be subject to demanding
 
analysis by people with knowledge of the events under investigation and con­
siderable incentive to make sure that the truth comes out . . . . Thus there is a
 
real possibility that officers working in closed systems will feel less pressure to
 
be honest than officers who know that they may be forced to defend what they
 
say and report.
 
Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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not in support, of the public interest.”181  With respect to the police 
reports, the Bougas court found it significant that these items in­
cluded opinions of the police officers on the scene, notes from inter­
views with witnesses, and possible future leads of the 
investigation.182  As for the letters from private citizens, the SJC 
appeared concerned that the disclosure of these items could make 
citizens less likely to volunteer information to the police in the 
future.183 
The requestors’ status as defendants in pending criminal pro­
ceedings made no difference to the court.  As Justice Reardon put 
it, “the statute does not provide a ‘standing’ requirement but ex­
tends the right to examine public records to ‘any person’ whether 
intimately involved with the subject matter of the records he seeks 
or merely motivated by idle curiosity.”184 
While the decision proved to be a disappointment for advo­
cates of government transparency, the opinion concluded by setting 
forth some valuable principles. 
[A]n agency such as a police department cannot simply take the 
position that, since it is involved in investigatory work and some 
of its records are exempt under the statute, every document in its 
possession somehow comes to share in that exemption.  There is 
no blanket exemption provided for records kept by police de­
partments nor does the investigatory materials exemption extend 
to every document that may be placed within what may be char­
acterized as an investigatory file.  There must be specific proof 
elicited that the documents sought are of a type for which an ex­
emption has been provided.185 
B. Reinstein v. Police Commissioner186 
These principles took on new significance three years later 
when an attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union of Mas­
sachusetts made a formal request to the Boston Police Department 
(“BPD”) to inspect the records of discharged service weapons dur­
ing a five-year period.187  The request was denied because the cus­
todian claimed that confidential information, such as CORI 
181. Bougas, 354 N.E.2d at 876. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 876-77. 
184. Id. at 877. 
185. Id. at 878. 
186. 391 N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1979). 
187. Id. at 883. 
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background information and ongoing criminal investigations, was 
interwoven in the requested documents.188 
When the case eventually found its way before the SJC, the 
court noted that, notwithstanding the presumption in favor of dis­
closure and the statutory burden on custodians to prove the appli­
cability of an exemption, the typical records seeker “usually starts 
with a handicap of ignorance as to what exactly the records con­
tain.”189  In practice, this handicap had permitted custodians, armed 
with “the not inconsiderable advantage of full knowledge,” to argue 
successfully that “any attempt at analysis” would be tantamount to 
full disclosure.190 
In an effort to level the playing field, the Reinstein court ap­
proved a procedure initially set forth in the federal case of Vaughn 
v. Rosen,191 whereby records keepers must “itemize and index the 
records requested and give detailed justifications for [their] 
claims.”192  According to the Vaughn court, such a procedure was 
necessary due to the “inevitable [fact] that the party with the great­
est interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with desira­
ble legal precision for the revelation of the concealed 
information.”193  As Judge Wilkey put it, 
Obviously the party seeking disclosure cannot know the precise 
contents of the documents sought; secret information is, by defi­
nition, unknown to the party seeking disclosure. . . . In a very real 
sense, only one side to the controversy (the side opposing disclo­
sure) is in a position confidently to make statements categorizing 
information . . . .194 
Ultimately, the Reinstein court based its decision to remand 
the matter on a then-recent amendment to the public records law, 
which extended access “to any nonexempt ‘segregable portion’ of a 
public record.”195  In other words, the fact that a document may 
contain some exempt material does not justify barring access to all 
of it.196 
188. Id. at 883-84. 
189. Id. at 888. 
190. Id. 
191. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
192. Reinstein, 391 N.E.2d at 888. 
193. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823. 
194. Id. at 823-24. 
195. Reinstein, 391 N.E.2d at 885. 
196. Id. at 886.  The court also relied on the newly created statutory duty of seg­
regation to resolve the Boston Police Department’s claim that the information in ques­
tion was exempt from disclosure pursuant to the privacy exemption. See id. at 887-88. 
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C. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Commissioner197 
On September 15, 1992, a reporter from the Boston Globe 
made a public records request for materials compiled by the 
internal-affairs division of the Boston Police Department during its 
probe of alleged police misconduct in the investigation of the mur­
der of Carol Stuart and the shooting of her husband, Charles Stu­
art.198  This probe was preceded by a federal investigation which 
culminated with a twenty-page report and press release docu­
menting egregious police misconduct.199  According to the federal 
report, the Boston police coerced several witnesses into identifying 
a black man as the Stuarts’ assailant.200  In response to the federal 
report, the Boston Police Department issued its own fifty-three 
page report, which paraphrased civilian and police officer 
interviews.201 
In spite of these substantial prior disclosures, the records custo­
dian declined to provide the information requested, thereby 
prompting the newspaper and its reporter to seek declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the superior court.202  After hearing testimony 
from several witnesses, the trial judge produced a lengthy and de­
tailed memorandum evincing a painstaking in camera review of the 
materials.203  Based, in part, on the extensive publicity previously 
given to information the Boston Police Department had voluntarily 
disclosed,204 the judge ordered the records custodian to provide cer­
tain materials that might otherwise have been protected pursuant to 
the privacy or investigatory exemptions. 
On appeal, the SJC separated the records in question into five 
distinct categories and applied the different exemption standards to 
each.205  Through this process, the court was able to identify which 
Public records regulations now refer to this practice as “indexing.” See 950 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 32.08 (2003). 
197. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1995). 
198. Id. at 423-24. 
199. Id. at 423. 
200. Id.  As it turned out, Charles Stuart murdered his wife and then shot himself 
prior to concocting a cover story that they had been attacked by an unknown black 
assailant. See Charles A. Radin, A Mirror on Race: 1989 Slaying Forced the City to 
Confront Its Divisions, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1999, at A1. 
201. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 423. 
202. Id. at 423-24. 
203. Id. at 424.  In the future, the court suggested a protective order may serve as 
a more time-efficient method to analyze the issues and promote judicial economy. Id. 
at 430. 
204. Id. at 424. 
205. Id. 
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records would be made public and which qualified for exemptions, 
thereby reinforcing the rule that there are no blanket 
exemptions.206 
With respect to the privacy exemption,207 the SJC held that its 
invocation “require[d] a balancing between any claimed invasion of 
privacy and the interest of the public in disclosure.”208  According 
to the court, privacy interests were implicated whenever “disclosure 
would result in personal embarrassment to an individual of normal 
sensibilities,” where “the materials sought contain[ed] intimate de­
tails of a highly personal nature,” or when “the same information is 
[un]available from other sources.”209  On the other side of the scale 
was the public’s interest in discovery, which included the value of 
knowing that public servants were following the rule of law in per­
formance of their duties.210 
In contrast, the investigatory exemption did not require a bal­
ancing test but rather a two-part analysis.211  The first question was 
whether the requested documents were “investigatory materials 
necessarily compiled out of the public view.”212  The second asked 
whether disclosure “would probably so prejudice the possibility of 
effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the 
public interest.”213 
The court’s ultimate findings regarding the records in question, 
though interesting, have limited precedential value in resolving the 
status of citizen complaints alleging police brutality.  This becomes 
clear when one considers that the statements at issue in the Globe 
case were obtained from witnesses of police misconduct who had to 
206. Id. at 425. 
207. This exemption “creates two categories of records exempt from public dis­
closure: first personnel and medical files or information and second other materials or 
data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. 
Chief of Police (Worcester Telegram II), 787 N.E.2d 602, 605 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Globe Newspaper Co. opinion 
dealt only with the second subset of materials.  As will be discussed, personnel and 
medical files or information are “absolutely exempt without need to consider the im­
pact of disclosure upon the privacy rights of a specifically named individual.” Id. at 605. 
208. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 428. 
209. Id. at 425 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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be prodded or coaxed to “com[e] forward with information.”214 
Rarely, if ever, is a victim of police brutality the subject of such 
encouragement.  On the contrary, it is a well-documented fact that 
law enforcement officers frequently “discourage [victims] from fil­
ing complaints, using a variety of strategies.”215  In the words of one 
former police chief: “The police world has a hundred different ways 
of deflecting complaints.”216  In short, citizens who manage to bring 
complaints despite threats, misinformation, and coercion are hardly 
the sort of individuals whose participation hinges on a promise 
“that the public will [not] have access to any statements they 
make.”217 
D. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police218 
In May, 1999, “Shawn Wilder filed a complaint alleging mis­
conduct by Patrolman Michael A. Tarckini when, without cause or 
explanation, he detained and arrested Wilder at gunpoint.”219  Af­
ter a subsequent investigation by the internal-affairs division of the 
Worcester Police Department exonerated the officer, a city newspa­
per sought documents related to the investigation.220  The records 
214. Id.  As one federal judge has noted, “It is not uncommon for witnesses to be 
reluctant to provide statements alleging police misconduct.”  McAllister v. City of 
Memphis, No. 01-2925 DV, 2005 WL 948762, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2005). 
215. Jenny Rachel Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files Be Public Record? Why 
Internal Affairs Investigations and Citizen Complaints Should Be Open to Public Scru­
tiny, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1006, 1035 (2009); see also Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Com­
munity Consent to Local Policing: The Need for Democratically Negotiated Community 
Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 499 
n.170 (2001) (“Studies have indicated that police tend to discourage citizen complaints 
by acting hostile when complaints are filed, showing lack of objectivity in the investiga­
tion, failing to provide formal adversary hearings, and being unwilling to impose mean­
ingful discipline on officers found guilty of misconduct.”). 
216. ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: PO­
LICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting former Minneapolis Police Chief Tony 
Bouza)).  One undercover investigation of this phenomenon revealed “officers refusing 
to provide a form for a complaint . . . and ordering undercover complainants to leave 
the building.”  Macht, supra note 215, at 1035-36 (citing David Goldstein Reports: Want R 
to File a Complaint Against a Cop? Good Luck! (CBS television broadcast), available at 
http://cbs2.com/goldstein/CHP.File.Complaint.2.516330.html). 
217. Globe Newspaper Co., 648 N.E.2d at 427. 
218. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police (Worcester Telegram 
I), 764 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 2002); Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d 602 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2003). 
219. Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d at 849; Brief of the Plaintiff/Appellee at 3, 
Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d 847 (No. SJC-08601). 
220. Worcester Telegram I, 764 N.E.2d at 849. 
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custodian denied this request.221  The paper then appealed to the 
Supervisor who directed the custodian to produce the requested 
records and “redact[ ] only the names and identifying details of vol­
untary witnesses, complainants, and informants.”222  When the cus­
todian refused to comply with this order, the newspaper brought 
suit in superior court.223 
As part of that action, the newspaper filed “a motion to permit 
inspection of the public records sought, subject to a protective or­
der.”224  Concluding that the custodian “could not be the sole arbi­
ter of the applicability of any exemption to disclosure,” the trial 
court allowed the motion.225  Eventually, this ruling came before 
the SJC on the custodian’s petition for interlocutory relief.226 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Spina conceded that all 
of the documents requested could be “‘personnel files’ that would 
be exempt from disclosure.”227  Nevertheless, given the equally 
strong possibility that the documents contained “a combination of 
personnel information and other materials that would be segregable 
and subject to disclosure as ‘public records,’” the court refused to 
permit the custodian to “decide unilaterally, without any oversight, 
what documents are subject to disclosure and what documents are 
exempt.”228  In the final analysis, the court regarded the custodian’s 
designation of the records to be inconsequential.229  Characterizing 
the custodian’s efforts to shield the records from any scrutiny as 
“wholly inconsistent” with the purpose of the public records law, 
the SJC upheld the limited disclosure the trial judge had allowed.230 
When the case returned to the superior court, the newspaper 
examined the contested public records pursuant to the protective 
order, then moved for summary judgment.231  A superior court 
judge ultimately ordered the custodian to “release, as public 
records, . . . the entire, unredacted contents of the Wilder file, ex­
cepting only documents containing information protected as crimi­
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 850. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 851. 
227. Id. at 853. 
228. Id. 
229. “What is critical,” Justice Spina wrote, “is the nature or character of the 
documents, not their label.” Id. at 854. 
230. Id. at 853. 
231. Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
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nal offender record information (CORI).”232  Once again, the 
records custodian appealed.233 
Citing Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. School Committee,234 the 
keeper of the police records argued that “all the material in the 
Wilder file is categorically exempt ‘personnel [file] or information’ 
because it is part of a disciplinary report.”235  The appeals court 
disagreed. 
Of particular relevance, the court noted the essential role of 
internal-affairs investigations: “A citizenry’s full and fair assessment 
of a police department’s internal investigation of its officer’s actions 
promotes the core value of trust between citizens and police essen­
tial to law enforcement and the protection of constitutional 
rights.”236  The court read the Policy and Procedure of the Worces­
ter Police Department internal-affairs division to support the con­
clusion that public confidence is bolstered by transparency in its 
investigations.237  “It would be odd, indeed,” wrote Justice Grasso, 
“to shield from the light of public scrutiny as ‘personnel [file] or 
information’ the workings and determinations of a process whose 
quintessential purpose is to inspire public confidence.”238 
IV. THIRD-PARTY MOTION PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Of course, it is by now well-settled that “[a] defendant’s right 
of access to information gathered by an internal affairs division 
does not turn on whether the investigatory materials are or are not 
subject to disclosure as public records.”239  When the SJC made this 
pronouncement in Commonwealth v. Wanis, it went on to offer the 
following guidance to judges confronting defense motions for access 
to internal-affairs records unrelated to their own criminal cases: 
A defendant may not obtain information in the possession of an 
internal affairs division, other than statements of percipient wit­
nesses, without seeking a summons for the production of that in­
formation and, if production is opposed, without making a 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Wakefield Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Comm., 731 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 2000). 
235. Worcester Telegram II, 787 N.E.2d at 605.  The Wakefield court had previ­
ously ruled that a “disciplinary decision and report” by a superintendent of schools 
concerning the conduct of a public school teacher was exempt from disclosure. Id. 
236. Id. at 607. 
237. Id. at 607 & n.6. 
238. Id. at 608. 
239. Commonwealth v. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Mass. 1998). 
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showing to a judge (normally by affidavit) that there is a specific, 
good faith reason for believing that the information is relevant to 
a material issue in the criminal proceedings and could be of real 
benefit to the defense.  Such a standard meets constitutional re­
quirements.  Personal information about a police officer, his or 
her previous conduct, and the conclusions of those conducting an 
internal affairs investigation, for example, should be disclosed 
only on such a showing.240 
To understand what this preliminary showing entails (and why 
it may no longer be an accurate statement of the law) one must 
view Wanis in the context of a series of cases construing a criminal 
defendant’s right to third-party records related to the treatment of 
alleged victims of sexual assaults. 
A. Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles241 
In 1984, counsel for two juveniles charged with rape filed mo­
tions seeking an in camera inspection of the complainant’s counsel­
ing records.242  Rather than rule on these motions, a juvenile court 
judge reported questions to the SJC concerning the tension be­
tween the absolute confidentiality afforded to rape counseling 
records by section 20J of chapter 233243 and a defendant’s constitu­
tional right to due process.244 
Because the plain language of the statute expressly forbade 
any dissemination of communications involving a sexual assault 
240. Id. at 412 (citation omitted). 
241. 491 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1986), abrogated in part by Commonwealth v. 
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991). 
242. Id. at 236. 
243.	 The statute at issue provides, in pertinent part: 
A sexual assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential communi­
cation, without the prior written consent of the victim . . . . 
Such confidential communications shall not be subject to discovery and 
shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding without the prior writ­
ten consent of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper or memo­
randum relates. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20J (2008). 
244. Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236; see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 34 (permitting trial 
judges to report questions to the SJC).  The two questions were, 
(1) Does G.L. c. 233, § 20J . . . prevent this Court from permitting an in cam­
era inspection of communications between a sexual assault counselor and an 
alleged victim of a sexual assault; and (2) if so, is G.L. c. 233, § 20J constitu­
tional in light of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States or the cognate provisions of the Massachu­
setts Declaration of Rights? 
Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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counselor,245 the SJC observed that an in camera inspection could 
only be justified by “a determination that the juveniles have a con­
stitutional right which transcends the statute and requires the courts 
to fashion an exception to the statute (or perhaps, alternatively, to 
strike it down).”246 
The court then endeavored to “outline certain principles” to 
assist judges in deciding when “the absolute privilege expressed in 
§ 20J, a nonconstitutionally based testimonial privilege, must yield 
at trial to the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to have 
access to privileged communications.”247  This process led to a look 
at the prima facie showings required by other courts faced with sim­
ilar circumstances.248  After noting the numerous ways in which this 
burden had been expressed,249 the SJC declined the opportunity to 
delineate the preliminary showing required for access to material 
covered by Section 20J.250  Instead, the court simply stated that a 
defendant seeking an “in camera inspection of . . . privileged mate­
rial . . . must show a legitimate need for access to the communica­
tions.”251  The court further noted that this hurdle could not be 
overcome by proof that the communications were “likely to be rele­
vant and material to the case” or that they were unavailable from 
any other source.252  Ultimately, the SJC held that the propriety of 
in camera review hinged on the defendant’s ability to “demonstrate 
that the protected information is likely to be useful to his 
defense.”253 
B. Commonwealth v. Stockhammer254 
The Stockhammer case involved another allegation of rape 
where the defense was consent.255  Approximately nine months af­
ter the undisputed intercourse took place,256 the complainant at­
tempted suicide and received medical attention at Waltham-Weston 
245. Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d at 236. 
246. Id. at 237. 
247. Id. at 237, 238. 
248. Id. at 238. 
249. Id. at 238-39. 
250. Id. at 239. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 239-40. 
254. 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991). 
255. Id. at 997. 
256. The defendant claimed that the parties had intercourse on numerous occa­
sions; the complainant testified that the only time that they had sex was the night the 
defendant raped her. See id. at 995-96. 
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Hospital.257  Two days after her release from this facility, the com­
plainant obtained six days of inpatient treatment from a New York 
hospital, then four months of counseling from a licensed social 
worker.258 
Prior to trial, the defendant attained access to the Waltham-
Weston Hospital records.259  Pursuant to a court order mandating 
the production of psychotherapy or counseling records, the social 
worker’s records were also produced and the judge conducted an in 
camera review of them.260  Satisfied that none of these records con­
tained material that would be helpful to the defense, the judge re­
fused to order their disclosure.261 
After the defendant was convicted, he learned about the exis­
tence of the New York hospital records and moved for a new 
trial.262  Prior to ruling on the motion, the trial judge conducted an 
in camera review of these records and concluded that they were no 
more helpful than the social worker records that he had previously 
refused to disclose.263 
The SJC reversed.264  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice 
Greaney took issue with the Supreme Court’s then-recent conclu­
sion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie265 that “the interests of the defen­
dant and the State in a fair trial are fully protected by an in camera 
review of [privileged] records by the trial judge.”266  As Justice 
Greaney put it, 
The Federal standard requiring only an in camera review by 
the trial judge of privileged records requested by the defendant 
rests on the assumptions that trial judges can temporarily and ef­
fectively assume the role of advocate when examining such 
records; and that the interests of the State and complainant in the 
confidentiality of the records cannot adequately be protected in 
any other way.  Neither assumption withstands close scrutiny.267 
With respect to the “first assumption,” the SJC reiterated its 
longstanding concern regarding “[t]he danger lurking in the prac­
257. Id. at 996. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 1000-01. 
264. Id. 
265. 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
266. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1001. 
267. Id. 
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tice of . . . in camera review [of privileged documents]” given the 
difficulty for judges to discern “what is necessary to the defense.”268 
As to the “second assumption,” Stockhammer expressed the skepti­
cism “that the interests of the State and the complaining witness in 
preserving the confidentiality of communications to psychothera­
pists and social workers can only be protected by an in camera re­
view procedure.”269  Citing the “broad discretion” trial judges have 
“to control the proceedings before them,” the SJC offered that 
“judges could allow counsel access to privileged records only in 
their capacity as officers of the court,” and “[p]rotective orders (en­
forced by the threat of sanctions) requiring counsel and other nec­
essary participants in the trial not to disclose such information 
could be entered.”270 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the SJC made an important 
distinction between the case before it and Two Juveniles.  Whereas 
the earlier case implicated the “absolute privilege” set forth in sec­
tion 20J, Stockhammer involved two statutes271 “contain[ing] ex­
ceptions limiting their scope.”272  According to the court, this 
difference in the level of legislative protection afforded to informa­
tion had implications when considering the extent of a defendant’s 
constitutional rights to disclosure.273  In short, Stockhammer ad­
vised courts to be less reluctant in ordering the production of docu­
ments when only qualified statutory privileges served as the source 
of their protection.274 
C. Commonwealth v. Bishop275 
The Bishop case concerned allegations of sexual misconduct 
perpetrated by a Boy Scout leader against two teenage brothers.276 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed several motions to compel the dis­
closure of certain records related to the treatment of the alleged 
268. Id. (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Clancy, 524 N.E.2d 395, 398-99 (Mass. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
269. Id. at 1002. 
270. Id. 
271. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 135 (2008); ch. 233, § 20B. 
272. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1002. 
273. Id. at 1002-03. 
274. The SJC would later reach a different conclusion in Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira.  728 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 2000) (declining to impose different standards 
depending on the type of statutory privilege involved). 
275. 617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 
N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006). 
276. Id. 
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victims.277  Following a hearing on one of the motions concerning 
records in the possession of a medical clinic, the judge declined to 
order the disclosure of “[e]ntries dealing with psychiatric and 
mental health assessments and treatment contained in the clinic’s 
records.”278 
After the defendant was convicted, he asserted that this ruling 
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.279  The SJC, in af­
firming the conviction, began its opinion with a recitation of bed­
rock principles: 
[W]hen relevant evidence is excluded from the trial process for 
some purpose other than enhancing the truth-seeking function, 
the danger of convicting an innocent defendant increases.  Rele­
vant evidence refers to any evidence which has a tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de­
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. . . . “[D]isclosure, rather than 
suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper 
administration of criminal justice.”280 
By the same token, the court acknowledged that the “revela­
tion of privileged information adversely affects the purposes under­
lying the need for the confidential relationship and serves as a 
disincentive to the maintenance of such relationships.”281 
In an effort to balance these “competing interests,” the Bishop 
court sought to set forth a new standard.282  However, prior to delv­
ing into this task, the court paused to make an important point: 
because the typical defendant cannot be certain that the privileged 
record contains “exculpatory or even relevant information,” a claim 
that “nondisclosure . . . violates his or her right to a fair trial is 
tenuous.”283 
Under such circumstances, “requiring the defendant to make 
too substantial a showing to justify piercing a privilege” runs the 
risk of “plac[ing] the defendant in a ‘Catch-22’ situation.”284  In or­
der to obtain “access to the privileged records [the] defendant must 
277. Id. at 993-94. 
278. Id. at 994 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 
A.2d 1290, 1299 (Pa. 1992) (Zappala, J., dissenting)). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 995. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 996 n.6. 
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specifically allege what useful information may be contained in the 
target records.  However, [the] defendant has no way of making 
these specific allegations until he has seen the contents of the 
records.”285 
Ultimately, Bishop settled on a threshold showing that re­
quired a defendant to “advance, in good faith, at least some factual 
basis which indicates how the privileged records are likely to be 
relevant to an issue in the case.”286  For defendants able to over­
come this initial burden, the next step in the process entailed judi­
cial scrutiny of the records.287  Assuming the reviewing judge found 
at least some portion of the records relevant, Bishop established a 
defendant’s right to “access to the relevant privileged materials for 
the limited purpose of” filing a motion to disclose “the relevant 
communications to the trier of fact.”288 
D. Commonwealth v. Fuller289 
Like Stockhammer, Fuller involved allegations of sexually as­
saultive behavior where the defense was consent.290  Unlike 
Stockhammer where the privileges in question were qualified in na­
ture, the privilege at issue in Fuller was the same “absolute privi­
lege” at the heart of Two Juveniles. 
During the discovery process, the prosecution informed Fuller 
that his accuser had received counseling after the incident from a 
rape crisis center (the “Center”) “and also that she had received 
similar counseling in 1991 and 1992, after a sexual assault in 1991 
involving a different perpetrator.”291  When a superior court judge 
ordered the Center to produce all records of the complainant’s 
counseling along with a letter identifying any pertinent privileges, it 
refused to do so without the complainant’s consent.292  This led the 
superior court judge to hold the executive director of the Center in 
285. Id. (quoting People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 96 (Ill. 1988) (Simon, J., dissent­
ing)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
286. Id. at 996-97.  “In considering the defendant’s request,” Justice Nolan wrote, 
“the judge may consider, among other things, the nature of the privilege claimed, the 
date the target records were produced relative to the date or dates of the alleged inci­
dent, and the nature of the crimes charged.” Id. at 997. 
287. Id. at 996. 
288. Id. at 997. 
289. 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 
N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006). 
290. Id. at 849-50. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
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contempt.293  A single justice of the appeals court subsequently 
stayed this order, and the case was transferred to the SJC by its own 
motion.294 
In the process of vacating the contempt order, Justice Greaney 
modified the prima facie showing needed to convince judges to con­
duct in camera reviews of rape counseling records.295  Because 
Bishop’s “likely to be relevant” standard had proven to be “too 
broad and flexible when applied to records protected by § 20J,” 
Fuller adopted “more stringent” criteria designed to curtail the 
number of instances in which the absolute privilege would be abro­
gated.296  Specifically, the Fuller court held that 
[a] judge should undertake an in camera review of records privi­
leged under § 20J, only when a defendant’s motion for produc­
tion of the records has demonstrated a good faith, specific, and 
reasonable basis for believing that the records will contain excul­
patory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the 
defendant’s guilt.297 
E. Commonwealth v. Wanis298 
On the night of February 6, 1997, a uniformed Boston police 
officer observed three men pass through an area near Faneuil Hall 
where the public was not permitted.299  When the officer advised 
the three men to leave the area, one of them allegedly responded in 
a threatening manner.300  While attempting to subdue this suspect, 
another purportedly “reached into the pocket of his leather jacket, 
while the third attempted to intervene on behalf of the other 
two.”301  The officer subsequently produced his service revolver and 
arrested the men on charges of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, assault and battery on a police officer, resisting 
arrest, and disorderly conduct.302  In the wake of this incident, one 
293. Id. at 849. 
294. Id. at 849-50. 
295. Id. at 854-56. 
296. Id. at 854-55. 
297. Id. at 855; see also id. (defining “material evidence” as “evidence which is 
not only likely to meet criteria of admissibility, but which also tends to create a reasona­
ble doubt that might not otherwise exist”). 
298. 690 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1998). 
299. Id. at 409. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 410. 
302. Id. 
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of the defendants filed a citizen complaint against the officer with 
the Boston Police Department (“BPD”).303 
When attorneys for two of the defendants moved for the pro­
duction of BPD records related to the incident, a judge found that 
each defendant was entitled to “receive all statements relating to 
this case by police, other witnesses and co-defendants in the cus­
tody of the Commonwealth including police department.”304  This 
order compelled the “production of statements of percipient wit­
nesses obtained during the ongoing investigation conducted by the 
internal affairs division of the [BPD].”305 
Both the BPD and the Commonwealth filed petitions for relief 
from the order pursuant to General Laws of Massachusetts chapter 
211, section 3.306  In its petition, the BPD took the position that 
“internal affairs records are exempt from disclosure as public 
records” because they are “(1) ‘investigatory materials,’ . . . and (2) 
materials relating to a person ‘the disclosure of which may consti­
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’”307  Characteriz­
ing these exemptions as “similar” to the statutory privileges at issue 
in sexual assault cases,308 the BPD argued that the stringent prelim­
inary showing set forth in Fuller applied and the defendants had 
failed to satisfy it.309 
For Chief Justice Wilkins, whether the statements at issue were 
subject to disclosure as public records was a red herring.310  “Even 
if the custodian of internal affairs documents could meet the statu­
tory burden of showing with specificity that an exemption applies, a 
criminal defendant may nevertheless have a right to obtain such 
documents.”311  Ultimately, the court concluded that “a judge 
303. Id. 
304. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. (citation omitted). 
308. In a footnote, the SJC appeared to take a dim view of this comparison and 
expressly declined to create a common law privilege to protect the disclosure of state­
ments made to internal-affairs divisions. See id. at 410 n.3. 
309. Id. at 410. 
310. It is worth noting that while the Wanis defendants did “not argue that the 
subject records are public records under G.L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth,” id. at 642, the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Attorneys made no such concession, see Brief Amici Curiae of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services & the Massachusetts Ass’n of Criminal Defense Attorneys 
at 9 n.2, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL 33832505, at *9 
n.2 (“[S]tatements of percipient witnesses do not fall under exemptions to the public 
records law.”). 
311. Wanis, 690 N.E.2d at 411 (citation omitted). 
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should normally issue a subpoena to the internal affairs division of 
a police department directing it to produce any statements of 
percipient witnesses,” and that “[n]o special showing of relevance 
or need is required.”312  Applying this standard to the case before 
it, the Wanis court ordered the BPD to “produce all statements in 
its possession or control received from percipient witnesses (police, 
codefendants, and others) concerning circumstances relating to the 
crime or crimes allegedly committed.”313 
With respect to the Commonwealth’s petition, Chief Justice 
Wilkins agreed that the Suffolk County District Attorney “should 
not have been subjected to an order to produce documents from 
the police department’s internal affairs division.”314  Perhaps more 
importantly, the court also accepted the Commonwealth’s invita­
tion to “restrict any inquiry into Internal Affairs Division files, 
other than percipient witness statements, by adopting the restric­
tions of Fuller.”315 
This invitation came in the final section of the brief filed on 
behalf of the Suffolk District Attorney and was altogether ignored 
by the defendants as well as amicus curiae.316  According to the Suf­
folk District Attorney, adopting the substantial preliminary require­
ment set forth in Fuller was necessary to prevent an “unrestrained 
foray into confidential records” unlikely to unearth relevant infor­
mation.317  As the following passage makes clear, the premise of 
this argument rested largely on the limited role propensity evidence 
played in self-defense cases prior to Adjutant:318 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
314. Id. at 411.  On this point, the court appeared to give credence to claims that 
“all parts of a police department are not monolith,” and that “[b]oth practically and 
logically [internal-affairs divisions are] separate and distinct from the rest of a police 
department.”  Brief of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 
407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL 33832506, at *9.  Accordingly, it is now clear 
that motions for records in the possession of an internal-affairs division must be filed 
under Rule 17, rather than Rule 14, and directed to records custodians at police depart­
ments rather than prosecutors. 
315. Brief for the Appellant on Reservation & Report by the Single Justice of the 
Appellants’ Petition for Relief Under G.L. c.211, §3 from an Order of the Boston Mu­
nicipal Court at 49, Wanis, 690 N.E.2d 407 (No. SJC-07569), available at 1997 WL 
33832536, at *49. 
316. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the Committee for Public Counsel Ser­
vices & the Massachusetts Ass’n of Criminal Defense Attorneys, supra note 310. R 
317. Brief for the Appellant on Reservation & Report by the Single Justice of the 
Appellants’ Petition for Relief Under G.L. c.211, §3 from an Order of the Boston Mu­
nicipal Court, supra note 315, at 42. R 
318. Id. at 44-48. 
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The reason for requiring [compliance with the Bishop-Fuller 
protocol] is the likely irrelevance and inadmissibilty of even neg­
ative facts contained [in internal affairs records].  For instance, 
even assuming information of some prior bad act by an officer, 
such information is not necessarily material and exculpatory. 
Thus, even illegal acts by an arresting or investigating officer are 
not per se subject to disclosure, however, because they may be 
irrelevant and inadmissible in a particular case. . . . 
Further, [a]s a general rule, evidence of a person’s character 
is not admissible to prove that he acted in conformity with that 
character on a particular occasion.  Thus, [f]or the purpose of 
proving that one has or has not done a particular act, it is not 
competent to show that he has or has not been in the habit of 
doing similar acts. . . . 
Although a defendant charged with assault and battery . . . 
may offer evidence of a victim’s character for violence when he 
asserts a claim of self-defense, under the Massachusetts rule he 
may do so only if he shows that the violent character of the vic­
tim was known to him prior to the incident in question[,] because 
the victim’s reputation for violence is relevant solely on the issue 
of reasonable apprehension.  Therefore, defendant must show 
that he was aware of the allegedly violent character of the police 
officers involved prior to the incident in question.319 
Since knowledge of an arresting officer’s violent character is no 
longer required to introduce such evidence at trial, using Fuller’s 
stringent threshold showing to restrict access to prior citizen com­
plaints can no longer be justified.  This conclusion becomes ines­
capable in light of the SJC’s decision to abrogate Fuller “in favor of 
a new process that affords defense attorneys greater access to privi­
leged information.”320 
F. Commonwealth v. Dwyer321 
In 2001, the defendant and another individual named 
Lomberto were accused of raping and sexually assaulting their ado­
lescent cousin over a period of several years.322  Over the course of 
the next several months, the complainant received treatment from 
an array of mental health care providers.323 
319. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
320. Victor Hansen, Commonwealth v. Dwyer and the New Protocol Governing 
Access to Privileged Information, BOSTON B.J., May/June 2007, at 13, 13. 
321. 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006) (per curiam). 
322. Id. at 404. 
323. Id. 
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Prior to an order severing their cases, the defendant and 
Lomberto sought access to records reflecting such treatment pursu­
ant to the Bishop-Fuller protocol.324  These motions were denied on 
the ground that the defendant and Lomberto had failed to make 
the requisite preliminary showing.325 
The defendant stood trial first and was convicted.326  When 
Lomberto’s jury could not reach a verdict, the judge declared a mis­
trial.327  Prior to his retrial, Lomberto renewed his request for the 
complainant’s treatment records, and a different superior court 
judge allowed Lomberto’s motion and ordered that all such records 
be provided for an in camera review.  Ultimately, Lomberto and his 
attorney were permitted to examine and copy certain documents.328 
Dwyer subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based, in 
part, on the denial of access to the complainant’s therapy records. 
After the judge denied the motion without a hearing, the SJC or­
dered that Dwyer’s direct appeal be consolidated with his appeal 
from that ruling and granted his motion for direct appellate 
review.329 
Due to a combination of errors, the SJC found that Dwyer was 
entitled to a new trial.330  In an opinion issued by the full bench,331 
the court also took the opportunity to announce “a new protocol” 
to be applied “in every criminal case . . . where a defendant seeks 
pretrial inspection of statutorily privileged records of any third 
party.”332 
This decision stemmed from the court’s “continuing concerns 
about potential constitutional infirmities of some aspects of the 
324. Id. at 405. 
325. Id. at 405-06. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id.  This proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for Lomberto.  Although he was 
permitted to introduce redacted copies of the records at his second trial, the jury “re­
turned guilty verdicts against Lomberto on two of the rape charges and three of the 
indecent assault and battery charges.” Id. 
329. Id. at 404, 406. 
330. Id. at 404. 
331. As commentators have noted, Dwyer is unusual in that opinions issued by 
the SJC are almost always “authored by a specifically named justice.” ROSEMARY B. 
MINEHAN & R. MARC KANTROWITZ, 53 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES: MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW § 12.153, at 697 n.1 (2007). 
332. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414 (noting that “the protocol is not limited to sexual 
assault cases”).  Prior to announcing the new protocol, the SJC had formed a committee 
to “study and present to the court alternatives to the [Bishop-Fuller] protocol regarding 
defense access to privileged records in sexual assault cases.”  Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 
805 N.E.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Mass. 2004). 
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Bishop-Fuller protocols.”333  Foremost among such concerns was 
“the inability of defendants to meet the stringent Fuller standard,” 
notwithstanding the strong possibility that exculpatory evidence 
could be found in the statutorily privileged records.334 
To obtain a judicial summons for such records under the 
Dwyer protocol, a defendant must first establish “good cause” by 
demonstrating 
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they 
are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by 
exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly pre­
pare for trial without such production and inspection in advance 
of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend 
unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is 
made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing 
expedition.”335 
Assuming a defendant can make this preliminary showing, a 
court must determine whether the records in question are in fact 
privileged.336  If a judge finds that the records are not privileged, 
the record holder must “produce all responsive records.”337  If a 
particular record is not privileged but nonetheless contains “infor­
mation of a personal or confidential nature, such as medical or 
school records,” Dwyer gives a judge discretion to “order such 
records produced subject to an appropriate protective order.”338 
V. PUBLIC RECORDS LAW IN PRACTICE 
Prior to writing this Article, the authors possessed anecdotal 
evidence that some municipalities have a policy of providing re­
dacted copies of citizen complaints alleging police brutality when 
such complaints are requested under chapter 66, section 10 of the 
General Laws of Massachusetts.339  Armed with the number and 
333. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414. 
334. Id. at 417; see also id. at 418 (calling the Bishop-Fuller protocol “a court-
imposed requirement all but impossible to satisfy”). 
335. Id. at 415 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lampron, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76-77 (Mass. 
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
336. Id. at 420. 
337. Id. at 421. 
338. Id. at 421 n.5. 
339. See Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Be Furnished with Boston Police 
Department Records on Internal Investigations, supra note 16, at 76 (“The Defendant is R 
entitled to the Internal Affairs records he is requesting, but he cannot obtain them by 
way of a court order under Rule 17.  The proper way to obtain these public records is by 
filing a request with the Boston Police Department as required by the Freedom of In­
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nature of complaints against a particular officer, defense attorneys 
practicing in these jurisdictions have drafted discovery motions, 
which have resulted in the identification of Adjutant witnesses. 
The problem with advocating for such an approach is that 
records custodians across the Commonwealth appear to view their 
statutory obligations differently.  In order to find out just how dif­
ferently, three students from Western New England College School 
of Law sent letters to 346 cities and towns in Massachusetts.340  The 
letter identified the statute, the ten-day period for compliance, and 
pertinent case law supporting a citizen’s right to inspect public 
records.  The letter requested any records of complaints made 
against a specific police officer in that municipality.  The letter also 
asked for a waiver of any fees due to the educational purpose of the 
request. 
Out of the 346 letters mailed to the cities and towns, only 
64.7% replied to the request and barely half did so within the ten-
day period.341  The briefest response was a town stamp placed on 
the original letter request with a written note, “no records.”342  The 
longest response was a three-page letter acknowledging the exis­
tence of several records responsive to the request that would not be 
produced due to a statutory exemption.  Interestingly, two towns, 
forty-five miles apart, sent this exact same letter.343 
Most of the towns, 177 (76.9%), said that there were no 
records or complaints and 207 (90%) did not charge a fee.344  A few 
found pertinent information and either summarized it in the re­
formation Act.”); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to 
Summons Internal Affairs Division Documents of the Ware Police Department Pertain­
ing to Officer Shawn Crevier, supra note 19, at 3-4 (noting how documents provided in R 
response to public-records request did not include witness names or statements). 
340. A sample of the public-record request is on file with the authors.  The three 
students who worked diligently on this project were Thomas Gray, James O’Connor, 
and Louis DelGiacco.  The authors are grateful for their contributions to this Article. 
341. See infra Appendix A (detailing responses); Appendix B (listing towns that 
did not respond). 
342. Copies of all correspondence are on record with the Western New England 
Law Review. 
343. See infra Appendix A (Brookfield and Templeton). 
344. The authors chose to use both the percentages and the raw numbers in order 
to give the reader a picture of the full sample.  However, we recognize that the percent­
age is only reflective of the smaller sample of 216 rather than the 351 municipalities.  In 
total, 346 letters were sent by the students and received by the towns.  There were some 
addressing errors and one town where the law students could not find the necessary 
information. 
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sponse letter or provided copies of the complaints.345  Nineteen mu­
nicipalities (8%) said that they were unable to waive the fee and 
provided estimates of the total cost.  The least expensive estimate 
was $48.06 and the most expensive was $150.00.346  Several towns 
did waive the fee.347 
Most of the letters requested records pertaining to the chief of 
police.348  In many jurisdictions, the chief of police is one of the 
only people with access to the personnel records and thirty-seven of 
the responses came from the chief of police.  Fourteen acknowl­
edged that the focus of the request was the same person offering 
the response.349  Only one chief of police in the town of Auburn 
recused himself due to this conflict of interest.350 
Among those records custodians who denied access to infor­
mation, only two complied with their obligation to “advise the per­
son denied access of his or her remedies under 950 CMR 32.00 and 
M.G.L. c. 66, § 10(b).”351 
A final point of interest was the ripple effect that these public-
records requests caused.  The plain language of the statute provides 
that a citizen has a right to request public records without needing 
to show purpose or cause.352  In fact, pursuant to regulations 
promulgated by the supervisor of records, records custodians are 
expressly forbidden from inquiring as to the purpose of the re­
345. See infra Appendix A (Braintree, Oxford, Northbridge, and Ipswich summa­
rized their responses; Chelsea, Dalton, and Sutton enclosed information). 
346. Several others provided hourly rates and fees per page for copying. See infra 
Appendix A. 
347. Towns that waived the fee: Acton, Bolton, Braintree, Chelsea, Dalton, East-
ham, Holbrook, Holyoke, Ipswich, Marblehead, Methuen, New Braintree, North Read­
ing, Northampton, Oaks Bluff, Pittsfield, Plainville, Plymouth, Sturbridge, Sutton, and 
Worcester. See infra Appendix A. 
348. This was sometimes unintentional because the request was made of an of­
ficer with a long history in the department. 
349. The most humorous acknowledgment came from the chief of police in 
Aquinnah: “Unfortunately for you, but fortunately for me, there are no records.” 
350. Other chiefs of police may have recused themselves by having others in the 
office reply to the request, but only one letter formally notified us of this decision.  One 
hundred and forty-four (66.6%) of the letters came from other personnel.  See infra 
Appendix A for more information. 
351. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.08(1) (2003).  These remedies include the right to 
appeal the adverse ruling to the supervisor of records. Id. 32.08(2). 
352. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(a) (2008); A GUIDE TO THE MASSACHU­
SETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW, supra note 164, at 7 n.15 (citing General Laws of Massa- R 
chusetts chapter 66, section 10(a) for the proposition that “public records are to be 
provided to ‘any person’” (emphasis added)). 
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quest.353  Surprisingly, many towns responded to the request by re­
quiring more information prior to releasing the documents or even 
conducting a search.354  Several record keepers called Western New 
England College School of Law to speak with the students oversee­
ing the project, and one town employee called the dean of the law 
school questioning the motives of the request.355  In replying to the 
letter, many towns sent a carbon copy to other parties, such as the 
file of the identified officer, town managers, town counsel, or even 
the deans of the law school.356  One chief of police requested a copy 
of the final project and a town counselor inquired about the subject 
matter of the research project.357 
As the foregoing makes clear, the benefits to be gleaned from a 
public-records request for citizen complaints are directly tied to the 
particular municipality that receives the request.  While an arresting 
officer may have an extensive record of citizen abuse, if a records 
custodian refuses to provide copies of citizen complaints or even 
reply to the request, defense counsel cannot utilize the public 
records law to strengthen a discovery motion. 
VI.	 OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES TO INTERNAL-AFFAIRS 
RECORDS IN SELF-DEFENSE CASES 
As noted above, Justice Cordy’s decision in Adjutant rests, in 
large part, on a comprehensive survey of self-defense cases from 
across the country.358  This survey revealed that while courts in al­
most all jurisdictions now admit evidence concerning a victim’s pro­
353. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.05(5) (“Except when the requested records con­
cern information which may be exempt from disclosure pursuant to [MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch.] 4, §7, clause Twenty-sixth(n), [a] custodian may not require the disclosure of the 
reasons for which a requester seeks access to or a copy of a public record.”).  As one 
Supervisor of Public Records once noted, 
Under the provisions of [MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.] 66, § 10(b), when interpreting 
the public record definition, one is not permitted to evaluate the special cir­
cumstances of any particular person seeking access.  If a record is determined 
to be a public record it must be made available to any person upon request. 
The ultimate intentions of the person making the request cannot be considered. 
ALEXANDER J. CELLA, 39 MASSACHUSETTS  PRACTICE  SERIES: ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 1178, at 577 n.2 (1986) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quota­
tion marks omitted)). 
354. See infra Appendix A (Town of Sturbridge). 
355. See infra Appendix A (Norwood, Nantucket, Bellingham, Clinton, 
Manchester, Harvard, Otis, Shrewsberry, Acushnet, Wales). 
356. See infra Appendix A (City of Holyoke). 
357. See infra Appendix A (New Braintree and Marblehead). 
358. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 2005). 
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pensity for violence, the form such evidence may take varies 
depending on the forum.359 
Colorado is one of many jurisdictions that favors reputation 
evidence over specific acts of violence.  The rule in that state is that 
“specific, prior violent acts” are inadmissible if the defendant “did 
not, at the time of the offense, have actual knowledge of prior acts 
of violence committed by the victim.”360  In such cases, “the defen­
dant’s proof of the victim’s character or character trait for violence 
is confined to reputation or opinion testimony.”361 
In contrast, the California Rules of Evidence allow a defendant 
charged with assaultive conduct to offer evidence regarding a vic­
tim’s violent character in the form of personal opinion, reputation, 
or specific instances of the victim’s conduct.362  Such evidence is ad­
missible in California regardless of whether the defendant was 
aware of the victim’s reputation or prior violent acts when the al­
leged assault occurred. 
On the other end of the spectrum is New York.  A defendant 
facing the same allegations in that state may not offer any evidence 
pertaining to prior violent acts by the victim or the victim’s reputa­
tion for violence unless the accused happened to be cognizant of 
those acts or that reputation at the time of the encounter.363 
Based on the foregoing, it would be natural to assume that Cal­
ifornia defendants enjoy a distinct advantage over their counter­
parts in New York and Colorado when it comes to getting access to 
complaints about an arresting officer’s proclivity for using excessive 
or unnecessary force.  As the discussion below will show, such an 
assumption is at least partly correct. 
A. California 
In 1973, the Supreme Court of California decided the 
landmark case of Pitchess v. Superior Court364 and thereby gave 
birth to what has become known as a “Pitchess motion.”365  The 
defendant in Pitchess was charged with battering four deputy sher­
359. Id. at 11. 
360. People v. Ferguson, 43 P.3d 705, 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
361. Id. 
362. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a) (West 2009). 
363. See In re Robert S., 420 N.E.2d 390, 391-92 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Miller, 349 
N.E.2d 841, 845 (N.Y. 1976); People v. DiGuglielmo, 686 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div. 
1999). 
364. Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974). 
365. See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 621, 622 (Cal. 1993). 
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iffs and asserted a claim of self-defense in response to the officers’ 
use of excessive force.366  He requested discovery of previously doc­
umented complaints filed against the deputy sheriffs, which he hap­
pened to know existed.367  Two of the prior complainants were 
unavailable and two others were prepared to testify at trial but 
needed the formal complaints in order to refresh their memories of 
the details of their interactions with the officers.368 
After the trial court allowed the defendant’s discovery motion, 
the Sheriff of Los Angeles County sought a writ compelling the 
court to quash the subpoena duces tecum it had issued.369  Califor­
nia’s highest court declined to grant the writ.370  It held that the 
information which defendant sought may have had “considerable 
significance to the preparation of his defense.”371  Because “the 
documents ha[d] been requested with adequate specificity to pre­
clude the possibility that [the] defendant [was] engaging in a ‘fishing 
expedition,’” the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s discovery order.372 
The California legislature codified the “Pitchess motion” in 
1978 by making modifications to both the penal code and the rules 
of evidence.373  The penal code sets out the parameters for discov­
ery requests regarding confidential personnel records maintained 
by state or local agencies.374  The rules of evidence outline the pro­
cedural steps defense counsel must take to gain access to such 
records and include specific requirements concerning the notice to 
be provided as well as the contents of the affidavit that must be 
filed in support of the motion.375  The rules also provide guidance 
for courts to determine the relevance of evidence during an in cam­
era review, along with the authority to “make any order which jus­
tice requires to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary 
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.”376  According to the 
California Supreme Court, the “Pitchess motion” codification 
“carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace of­
366. Pitchess, 522 P.2d at 307. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. at 309. 
369. Id. at 307. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 309. 
372. Id. at 307. 
373. City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 621, 622 (Cal. 1993). 
374. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2008). 
375. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (West 2009). 
376. Id. § 1045(d). 
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ficer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s 
equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the 
defense.”377 
It is now clear that the prima facie showing required by Pitch­
ess does not compel defendants in California to “prove the exis­
tence of the records sought as a prerequisite to a discovery 
order.”378  Instead, defense counsel in that state may infer the exis­
tence of such complaints “from the facts of the pending litiga­
tion.”379  As Justice Hastings once observed, a more stringent 
preliminary showing “would make an accused’s rights dependent 
upon the highly fortuitous circumstance of the accused’s detailed 
knowledge as to the contents of the police officers’ personnel 
files.”380 
B. New York 
One year before California decided Pitchess, a New York de­
fendant charged with a narcotics violation requested an in camera 
review of internal affairs records to determine if they contained “a 
basis for cross-examination of [certain] officers as to prior ‘bad 
acts’, in order to impeach their credibility.”381  In opposing this mo­
tion, the police department sought to protect the privacy of its of­
ficers and took the position that “a subpoena duces tecum cannot 
be used to search for evidence in the absence of some showing that 
such evidence exists.”382 
After weighing the competing public policy interests, the trial 
court in People v. Sumpter declined the department’s request to 
quash the subpoena and thereby “preclude the possibility of de­
fense discovery of [impeachment] evidence, if it exists.”383  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the fundamental na­
ture of a defendant’s right to cross-examination384 and determined 
377. City of San Jose, 850 P.2d at 623. 
378. Lemelle v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 n.1 (Ct. App. 1978). 
379. City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 776 P.2d 222, 234 n.9 (Cal. 1989). 
380. In re Valerie E., 123 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (Ct. App. 1975) (citations and inter­
nal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 246 (concluding that a defendant who 
“clearly specified the exact material sought, i.e., all information regarding citizen com­
plaints for excessive force against the two police officers involved in her arrest” was 
entitled to such discovery). 
381. People v. Sumpter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
382. Id. at 674. 
383. Id. at 678. 
384. Id. at 673. 
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that “[p]olice officers stand on no different footing than any other 
witness.”385 
Within months of the Sumpter decision, four other New York 
trial courts reached contrary results and denied discovery requests 
for records of police misconduct.386  Due to the “unclear pattern” 
of these rulings, New York lawmakers enacted legislation applica­
ble to all cases where the production of internal-affairs records is 
sought.387  Pursuant to that statute, internal-affairs records are 
deemed “confidential” and cannot be disclosed without the consent 
of the officer or a court order.388  Before issuing such an order, a 
judge “must review all such requests and give interested parties the 
opportunity to be heard.”389  If the judge concludes that there are 
sufficient facts to warrant an in camera review, the personnel 
records in question must be sent directly to the court.390  It then 
becomes the judge’s task to “review the file and make a determina­
tion as to whether the records are relevant and material in the ac­
tion before him.”391 
Unfortunately, New York cases subsequent to the passage of 
this act continue to evince an unclear pattern.  In People v. Gis­
sendanner,392 New York’s highest court declined to impose a pre­
liminary burden upon defendants to establish that an internal 
affairs record “actually contains information that carries a potential 
for establishing the unreliability of either the criminal charge or of a 
385. Id. at 675. 
386. See People v. Torres, 352 N.Y.S.2d 101, 109 (Crim. Ct. 1973) (noting that 
records relating to prior bad acts by officers would be inadmissible at trial due to the 
rule prohibiting introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict denial of such acts); 
People v. Norman, 350 N.Y.S.2d 52, 61 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (citing the failure of defense 
counsel “to demonstrate any theory of relevancy or materiality of the information 
which may per chance be contained in the police records except for the mere specula­
tion and surmise that some information may be revealed which may provide the de­
fense counsel to cross examine the witness for possible impeachment”); People v. 
Coleman, 349 N.Y.S.2d 298, 302 (Nassau County Ct. 1973) (quashing subpoena based, 
in part, on the conclusion that defendant charged with assaulting officers was “foraging 
for evidence” that might make a claim of self-defense “reasonable”); People v. Fraiser, 
348 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (Nassau County Ct. 1973) (finding the possibility that “useful 
evidence may exist” as an insufficient “legal basis for a disclosure of records”). 
387. People v. Morales, 412 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315 (Crim. Ct. 1979); see also Gary R. 
DeFilippo, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: A Discussion of Civil Rights Law § 50-A, 
Protecting Law Enforcement Officers’ Personnel Records from Unwarranted Review, 14 
J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 103, 106 (2000) (citing N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a). 
388. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2009). 
389. Id. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979). 
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witness upon whose testimony it depends.”393  Instead, all the Gis­
sendanner court required was a “good faith [assertion] of some fac­
tual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file 
will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a 
desperate grasping at a straw.”394 
Although such a factual predicate appeared to be present in 
the subsequent case of People v. Francis,395 the court nevertheless 
denied the defendant’s request for access to prior complaints 
against his arresting officer.396  The defendant in Francis was 
charged with second degree assault and resisting arrest.397  In sup­
port of his application for the arresting officer’s internal-affairs file, 
the defendant asserted that he was the victim, rather than the per­
petrator, of an assault and that the officer who assaulted him had 
previously been sued in federal court for assaulting another individ­
ual who was acquitted of the cover charges the officer brought.398 
Despite the fact that an in camera review of the officer’s file 
revealed two complaints of excessive force, the court declined to 
order the disclosure of these records.399  In support of this decision, 
the Francis court articulated two reasons.  First, it explained that 
the complaints against the officer could not be used to demonstrate 
his “predisposition to assault individuals he arrests” since evidence 
of a party’s violent past could not be employed to establish conduct 
in conformity therewith.400  Given New York’s refusal to admit pro­
pensity evidence for the purpose of resolving the identity of the first 
aggressor, this rationale is, on some level, understandable. 
In contrast, the second ground for the court’s ruling displays an 
astonishing degree of naivety.  In this portion of the Francis opin­
ion, the court focused on the fact that the complaints of excessive 
force “resulted in determinations of ‘Unfounded,’ which means 
there was an administrative determination that the alleged incident 
had no basis in fact.”401  Based solely on the internal-affairs depart­
ment’s assessment of the evidence, the Francis court concluded that 
393. Id. at 928. 
394. Id. 
395. 566 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1991). 
396. Id. at 490. 
397. Id. at 488. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. at 489. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. But see Ritchie & Mogul, supra note 52, at 237; Simmons, supra note 52, R 
at 496; supra note 52 and accompanying text. R 
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the allegations of brutality were baseless and did not need to be 
disclosed to the defense.402 
To appreciate the danger of restricting access to internal-affairs 
files on such grounds, one need look no further than a recent study 
of the Chicago Police Department’s dysfunctional disciplinary 
mechanisms.403  As part of this study, researchers reviewed a sam­
ple of investigative files of civilian complaints and discovered that 
officers accused of abuse were rarely subjected to in-person inter­
views and investigators frequently made no contact with other of­
ficers who were present at the scene.404  As one former law 
enforcement officer put it: “If the Chicago Police Department in­
vestigated street crime the way that it investigates police abuse, it 
would never solve a case.”405 
C. Colorado 
In Colorado, the law regarding a defendant’s right to access 
internal affairs documents is both clear and unequivocal: “A defen­
dant who is charged with assaulting a police officer is entitled to 
disclosure of the fact that complaints charging excessive use of force 
have been filed against that officer.”406  The source of this rule is 
People v. Walker.407 
At trial, it was alleged that Walker participated in the robbery 
of a Denver bar with two other armed men.408  During the course of 
this robbery, the defendant struck the owner of the establishment 
on the head with a shotgun, then grabbed his wallet and fled.409 
With the assistance of two civilians, a responding officer chased the 
defendant to a nearby alley where the two exchanged gunfire.410 
The defendant was struck with several bullets; the officer emerged 
unscathed.411  During a subsequent search, the stolen wallet was re­
covered from the defendant.412 
402. Francis, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 490. 
403. See generally Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to 
Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s 
Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251 (2008). 
404. Id. at 275. 
405. Id. at 273 (citation omitted). 
406. People v. Trujillo, 114 P.3d 27, 30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). 
407. 666 P.2d 113, 121 (Colo. 1983). 
408. Id. at 115. 
409. Id. at 115-16. 
410. Id. at 116. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
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Prior to trial, the defendant sought access to the internal affairs 
file of the officer who shot him.413  After a hearing on the defen­
dant’s motion, the court elected to conduct an in camera inspection 
of the file but limited its review to “sustained complaints of brutal­
ity, excessive force, dishonesty, or untruthfulness.”414  Based on the 
absence of such complaints, the court ultimately decided not to dis­
close any documents to the defense.415 
After a jury convicted the defendant, he argued on appeal that 
the decision to limit the in camera review to “sustained complaints” 
required reversal.416  The Supreme Court of Colorado agreed.  Ac­
cording to Justice Neighbors, “[a] defendant who is charged with 
assaulting a police officer is entitled to disclosure of the fact that 
complaints charging excessive use of force have been filed against 
the officer involved.”417 
The Walker decision is significant for three reasons.  First, it 
exemplifies the length courts are supposed to go in giving defend­
ants the benefit of every doubt when a self-defense claim has been 
asserted.  As previously noted, in deciding the viability of such a 
defense, Massachusetts trial judges must credit the defendant’s ac­
count of the incident no matter how implausible that account might 
appear to be. Walker serves as a reminder that the presumption of 
innocence cannot be overlooked during the discovery phase of a 
criminal proceeding. 
Second, the Walker court rightly recognized that access to alle­
gations of police misconduct cannot be dependent upon whether 
such allegations resulted in officer discipline.  Indeed, “exonera­
tions” by internal-affairs departments must be viewed with a jaun­
diced eye when Department of Justice statistics show that “use-of­
force complaints received by agencies with an internal affairs unit 
were ‘more than twice as likely to be found not sustained than in 
agencies not having an internal affairs unit.’”418  Moreover, it must 
be remembered that the newly adopted standard in Massachusetts 
permits the introduction of “specific acts of prior violent conduct 
413. Id. at 121.  This officer was the alleged victim of the defendant’s first-degree 
assault. 
414. Id. 
415. Id. 
416. Id. 
417. Id. at 121-22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 122 (refusing to predicate a 
defendant’s discovery rights on the difference “between sustained and unsustained 
complaints”). 
418. Simmons, supra note 52, at 503 (quoting HICKMAN, supra note 51, at 5). R 
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that the victim is reasonably alleged to have initiated.”419  Since Ad­
jutant does not require conclusive proof that the prior violent con­
duct occurred, findings of no fault by internal-affairs departments 
cannot prevent Massachusetts defendants from obtaining access to 
the underlying complaints. 
Finally, Walker stands for the sensible proposition that evi­
dence may be discoverable in a criminal case even if it is not admis­
sible.  As noted above, unlike Massachusetts, Colorado prohibits 
evidence relating to a victim’s acts of violence unless the defendant 
was aware of such conduct at the time of the alleged assault.420 
Since one can assume that the typical criminal defendant in Colo­
rado lacks awareness of his arresting officer’s track record of using 
excessive force, complaints accusing an officer of brutality will al­
most never be brought to the attention of a Colorado jury.  Why, 
then, did Walker carve out a path to inadmissible material? 
The answer to this question may lie in the fact that the infor­
mation contained in citizen complaints appears “reasonably calcu­
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”421  Ironically, 
if a criminal defendant charged with assaulting a police officer is 
acquitted, she will often have a much easier time getting access to 
the arresting officer’s internal-affairs file if she brings a civil rights 
suit.422  The outcome in Walker may well be partly a product of the 
court’s discomfort in denying a criminal defendant access to infor­
419. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Mass. 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
420. COLO. R. EVID. 404. 
421. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (adopting the 
federal definition of discoverable information); MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (same). 
422. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Boston, 213 F.R.D. 99, 102 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(collecting cases where courts have ordered the disclosure of internal-affairs records 
notwithstanding claims that doing so would compromise or chill investigations).  This 
irony is compounded by the fact that victims of police brutality tend to have a much 
harder time admitting evidence of the defendant officer’s propensity for violence once 
they become plaintiffs in civil rights lawsuits. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show the person acted in conformity therewith.”).  While such evidence may 
serve as the cornerstone of a claim against the municipality that employed the officer, 
see, e.g., Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (1999) (citing instances where munic­
ipalities were held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), due to plaintiffs’ production of “evidence of prior complaints sufficient to 
demonstrate that the municipalities and their officials ignored police misconduct”), it is 
not uncommon for courts to give an individual officer his own separate trial due to the 
potential prejudice that may result when a plaintiff offers evidence of prior bad acts by 
the officer to establish the municipality’s liability, see generally Douglas L. Colbert, 
Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (1993). 
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mation a civil litigant would have little difficulty acquiring.  The de­
cision may also reflect a belief that inadmissible evidence of specific 
acts of violence could, in some cases, lead directly to admissible evi­
dence regarding the arresting officer’s reputation for violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the following points appear almost 
self-evident.  For starters, effective advocacy on behalf of a criminal 
defendant charged with assaulting a police officer will often depend 
on whether counsel can obtain access to that officer’s internal-
affairs file.  In cases where the identity of the first aggressor is in 
dispute, proper pretrial preparation will almost always require the 
production of such documents.  Corroborating a claim that the of­
ficer was the first aggressor is an uphill battle, as fact-finders are 
predisposed to credit the accounts of public officials entrusted with 
keeping the peace.  Testimony from past victims of police brutality 
has the potential to counter this natural tendency. 
A public-records request may, in some instances, produce the 
information a defense attorney needs to find these important wit­
nesses and present this exculpatory evidence.  However, the fate of 
a public-records request too often rests on the identity of the record 
custodian who happens to receive it.  A defendant’s right and abil­
ity to present Adjutant evidence should not depend on the willing­
ness of a municipality to acknowledge the existence of citizen 
complaints.  If a defendant makes a public-records request and the 
record custodian fails to provide the documents requested within 
ten days, courts should conclude that the defendant has exercised 
due diligence and the documents in question are not otherwise 
procurable in advance of trial. 
There is nothing improper about requiring a defendant to 
make a preliminary showing to ensure that the records sought are 
relevant and the request for them is grounded in good faith.  How­
ever, that showing should require no more than a simple assertion 
that the officer was the initial aggressor and any force offered by 
the defendant was justified in self-defense. 
Other jurisdictions, like California and Colorado, have insti­
tuted procedures for obtaining internal-affairs records that rely 
upon in camera reviews.  However, Massachusetts courts have 
wisely concluded that trial judges have enough to do without as­
suming the responsibility of examining documents with the eyes of 
an advocate.  The protocol announced in Dwyer affords record cus­
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todians an opportunity to draw attention to the privileged nature of 
any documents, or portions of any documents, in an officer’s inter­
nal-affairs file.  The Dwyer protocol also addresses legitimate con­
cerns of law enforcement by conditioning defense counsel’s receipt 
of personal or confidential information on compliance with the 
terms of a protective order. 
The primary purpose of the proposal set forth in this Article is 
to ensure the fairest possible trials in cases involving cross-accusa­
tions of criminally violent acts.  Under the present system, reasona­
ble allegations of violence on the part of arresting officers are too 
often excluded from the trial process.  This has increased the dan­
ger of convicting innocent defendants and resulted in the improper 
administration of justice. 
That being said, if our approach to this dilemma is adopted, at 
least three other beneficial by-products seem sure to follow.  First, 
removing inappropriate restrictions on access of internal-affairs 
records will likely hasten the departure of the most violent officers 
from police departments.  Logic dictates that if an officer’s track 
record of abuse makes it more difficult to obtain convictions, then 
that officer will either be headed for desk duty or will not be long 
for the force. 
Second, as officers with a propensity for violence leave law en­
forcement, the frequency and intensity of police brutality will un­
doubtedly decrease.  Finally, whitewashes by internal-affairs units 
appear destined to become less common the more frequently 
judges are put in a position to review their work.  In the words of 
Human Rights Watch, “[P]olice brutality will subside only once su­
perior officers judge their subordinates—and are judged them­
selves—on their efforts to provide sufficient and consistent 
oversight, appropriate administrative discipline and, when neces­
sary, punishment of the perpetrators of abuse.”423 
423. COLLINS, supra note 216, at 5. R 
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APPENDIX A—RESPONSES 
Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Acton Town Attorney 
Searching & compiling records; 
however, object to request where it 
seeks privileged or exempt 
material.  Sent follow-up letter on 
10/06/09 to say that the search did 
not turn up any letters.  Cc’d: 
Attorney Anderson, Acton Town 
Manager, Acton Town Clerk, 
Acton Chief of Police. 
Yes 
Acushnet Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection).  Called 
WNEC to find out purpose of 
request. 
n/a 
Adams Town Accountant No complaints. n/a 
Agawam Acting Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Amesbury Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Andover Chief of Police 
No complaints eligible under public 
records law and if there were, they 
would fall under “c” exemption. 
Requested records of the same 
person who responded in the 
letter. 
n/a 
Aquinnah Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter.  Acknowledged 
connection, “unfortunately for you, 
but fortunately for me, there are 
no records.” 
n/a 
Arlington Records Department No complaints. n/a 
Ashburnham Town Administrator No complaints. n/a 
Ashland Executive Secretary No complaints. n/a 
Athol* Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter, suggested further 
inquiry with town manager and 
board of selectmen. 
n/a 
Attleboro 
Keeper of the 
Records – Police 
Department 
No records. n/a 
* Athol was one of only two towns to provide a response that included a notice 
of the appeals process. See infra Brookfield. 
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Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Auburn Lieutenant 
No complaints.  Chief recused 
himself from the matter because he 
was the subject of the request. 
Cc’d:  Acting Town Manager, 
Attorney. 
n/a 
Avon Deputy Chief Extensive search. No 
Ayer Chief of Police 
If records exist, held at Ayer Town 
Hall.  Supplied address for Town 
Hall. 
n/a 
Barre Town Administrator 
Will not look until authorized in 
writing to pay for fees.  20¢/page. No 
Becket Unknown No complaints. n/a 
Bedford Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Bellingham Captain 
Found 11 pages associated with 
request.  Cost and preparation for 
mailing record $1/page or 50¢ if 
picked up.  Asked Dean Gaudio 
what we were doing; accused us of 
having an agenda; the officer 
whose documents were requested 
made the call. 
No 
Belmont Chief of Police 
Exemptions under G.L. c. 4, 
§7(26), denied request but then 
added that there are no citizen 
complaints. 
n/a 
Berkley Chief of Police 
Paper records, limited employees 
with access, costly search.  Fee is 
20¢ per page and $32.76/hour for 
personnel.  Cc’d:  Town Counsel. 
No 
Beverly Captain No records. n/a 
Billerica Deputy Chief No records. n/a 
Bolton Administrative Assistant No complaints. Yes 
Bourne 
Administrative 
Secretary to Chief 
of Police 
No complaints. n/a 
Boxborough Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
n/a 
Boxford Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
Boylston Administrative Assistant No complaints. n/a 
Braintree Chief of Police 
One anonymous complaint that 
turned out to be a disgruntled 
deputy chief, willing to provide 
copies.  Requested records of the 
same person who responded in the 
letter (this response acknowledged 
connection). 
Yes 
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Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Brewster Lieutenant 
Will not look until authorized in 
writing to pay for fees.  50¢/page 
and $26.03/hr with estimate work 
time of 2-3 hours. 
No 
Bridgewater Acting Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Brockton Sergeant, Internal Affairs 
No complaints.  Request reviewed 
by Brockton law department prior 
to response.  Chastised for not 
using the proper title of “chief of 
police.” 
n/a 
Brookfield* Administrative Assistant 
Several records responsive to 
request but refuse to provide them 
based upon exemption (f) 
investigatory materials.  3-page 
letter (exact same letter as used in 
Templeton).  Cc’d:  Acting Police 
Chief, Town Counsel. 
No 
Brookline Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Buckland Chief of Police 
Content.  Requested records of the 
same person who responded in the 
letter. 
n/a 
Burlington Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
Standardized form.  Accompanied 
reply. 
n/a 
Cambridge Legal Advisor No records. n/a 
Canton Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
Carver Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Chelmsford 
Administrative 
Assistant – 
Chelmsford Police 
Dept. 
No records. n/a 
Chelsea City Solicitor One record from internal affairs investigation enclosed. Yes 
Chesterfield Town Administrator No complaints. n/a 
Chilmark Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Clinton Telephone call to ask the purpose. 
Cohasset Lieutenant, Patrol Commander No complaints. n/a 
Concord Deputy Chief No records.  No complaints as Chief for 17 years or entire career. n/a 
Dalton Chief of Police 
Requested records enclosed, 
redacted based on advice from 
Town Counsel.  Waived $11.00 fee. 
Yes 
* Brookfield was one of only two towns to provide a response that included a 
notice of the appeals process. See supra Athol. 
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Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Danvers 
Administrative 
Services 
Commander 
No complaints. n/a 
Dartmouth Records Division No complaints. n/a 
Dedham Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
Deerfield Town Administrator 
No complaints.  Cc’d:  Chief of 
Police, file. n/a 
Dennis Commander of Support Services 
No complaints.  Noted that this 
does not reflect records of any 
other municipality. 
n/a 
Dover 
Keeper of the 
Records, Dover 
Police Department 
No “Officer Griffin” but there is a 
“Chief” Griffin, need to contact 
Dover Town Administrator. 
n/a 
Dracut Deputy Chief No complaints. n/a 
Dudley Town Attorney 
Will search records and reply 
within statutory period.  Cc’d: 
Police Chief, attorney. 
Unknown 
Dunstable Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Duxbury Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
East Bridgewater 
Administrative 
Specialist on 
behalf of Keeper 
of the Records 
No complaints. n/a 
East Brookfield 
Sergeant, Keeper 
of the Records, 
Internal Affairs 
No complaints. n/a 
East 
Longmeadow 
Administrative 
Assistant / Office 
Manager 
No complaints.  Search limited to 
their jurisdiction. n/a 
Eastham Chief of Police 
Police officer no longer employed, 
researching records.  Checked file 
and sent follow-up letter on 09/28/ 
09 to confirm that there are no 
complaints. 
Yes 
Easthampton 
Keeper of the 
Records – 
Easthampton 
Police Dept. 
M.G.L. c. 66, §10(a) allows police 
to charge copying and research 
time. 
No 
Easton Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Edgartown Administrative Assistant No complaints. n/a 
Egremont Records Department No complaints. n/a 
Erving Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Essex Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Everett 
Captain, 
Administrative 
Services 
No complaints. n/a 
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Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Fairhaven Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Framingham Assistant to the Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Franklin Town Attorney 
No records.  Complaints would not 
be handled through internal affairs. 
Cc’d:  Town Administrator, Chief 
of Police. 
n/a 
Freetown Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Georgetown Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Gill Town Administrator 
Included letters sent to the Chief 
about the complaint against him, 
follow-up letter sent to the people 
who filed the complaint as well as 
the minutes of the meeting where 
the complaint was reviewed. 
Yes 
Gloucester Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Goshen Sergeant No complaints. n/a 
Grafton Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Granby Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Granville Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Great Barrington Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Groton H.R. Director No complaints. n/a 
Groveland Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Halifax Town Administrator No records. n/a 
Hamilton Chief of Police No records.  Cc’d:  file. n/a 
Hampden Administrative Assistant Subject to a fee. No 
Hanson Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Hardwick Hardwick Police Dept. No records. n/a 
Haverhill Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
n/a 
Hawley Administrative Assistant No complaints. n/a 
Heath Officer Assistant No records. n/a 
Hingham Human Resources Office No complaints. n/a 
Hinsdale Sergeant No records. n/a 
Holbrook Acting Chief of Police No records. Yes 
133 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE103.txt unknown Seq: 61  4-MAY-10 16:10 
2010] ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
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Holden Project Coordinator No records. n/a 
Holliston Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Holyoke Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection).  Cc’d: 
Dean Arthur Gaudio, Dean Beth 
Cohen, Brenda Garton, Central 
File. 
Yes 
Hopkinton Administrative Manager No complaints. n/a 
Hudson 
Captain, 
Supervisor of 
Internal Affairs 
No records. n/a 
Hull Town Attorney Will review request and reply at later date.  Cc’d:  Town Manager. Unknown 
Huntington Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Ipswich Chief of Police 
Summarized citizen complaint of 
rude treatment during traffic stop. 
Cc’d:  focus of request. 
Yes 
Kingston Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Lanesborough Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Lee Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Leicester Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter.  Cc’d:  Internal 
Affairs file. 
No 
Lenox Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Leverett Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Lexington Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Lincoln Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
Littleton Chief of Police 
No complaints in last 11 years, 
would be a fee to access prior files. 
Estimates cost no more than $100, 
requested records of the same 
person who responded in the letter 
(this response acknowledged 
connection). 
No 
Longmeadow Records Clerk No records. n/a 
Lowell Superintendent of Police 
Forwarded request to city solicitor 
for her review.  Cc’d:  City 
Solicitor. 
n/a 
Lunenburg Unknown No records. n/a 
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Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Lynnfield Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Manchester Unknown 
No complaints.  Told the person 
whose info was requested (former 
employee), that person then called 
WNEC. 
n/a 
Marblehead Assistant Town Counsel 
Advised police chief to review 
records, will need time to conduct. 
Inquired as to the subject matter 
of the research project.  Follow-up 
letter sent 10/14/09, no records, no 
fee.  Cc’d:  Town Administrator, 
Chief of Police. 
Yes 
Marion Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Mashpee Keeper of Records No records. n/a 
Medfield Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Melrose Chief of Police 
Need to obtain permission from 
focus of request.  50¢/page and 
reasonable labor fee. 
No 
Mendon Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Methuen City Solicitor Sent copies of 1A records. Yes 
Milford Deputy Chief No records. n/a 
Millbury Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Monson Unknown No records. n/a 
Montague 
Board of 
Selectman 
Chairman 
No complaints. n/a 
Monterey Interdepartmental Secretary No records. n/a 
Nantucket Unknown Phone call to ask how to send a response of “no records.” n/a 
Natick Attorney’s Office 
Request being researched and 
estimated costs will be tallied. 
Cc’d:  Natick Police Department. 
No 
Needham 
Lieutenant, 
Keeper of the 
Records 
No records.  Reserved the right to 
withhold information in the future. n/a 
New Bedford Assistant City Solicitor 
Denied request under exemption 
M.G.L. c. 4, §7 n/a 
New Braintree Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
Requested copy of completed 
research project. 
Yes 
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New Salem Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
Yes 
Newburyport Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Newton 
Lieutenant, 
Internal Affairs 
Bureau 
No records. n/a 
North Adams Director No records. n/a 
North Andover Records Department No records. n/a 
North Reading Lieutenant No records. Yes 
Northampton Captain 
Redacted record enclosed, can 
petition for redacted information 
through office of secretary.  Cc’d: 
Captain. 
Yes 
Northborough Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Northbridge Chief of Police 
Summarized content of citizen 
complaint, will provide estimate if 
need actual court documents. 
Requested records of the same 
person who responded in the 
letter. 
No 
Northfield Administrative Assistant 
No records.  Cc’d:  Acting Police 
Chief. n/a 
Norwell Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Norwood Unknown Phone call to ask how to send a response of “no records.” n/a 
Oak Bluffs Executive Assistant Sent copies of 1A records. Yes 
Orange Administrative Assistant No complaints. n/a 
Otis Unknown Chief wanted to know why her name was used. n/a 
Oxford Chief of Police 
One complaint lodged in mid 
1990’s, but no record of it, could 
try Town Manager’s officer. 
Requested records of the same 
person who responded in the letter 
(this response acknowledged 
connection). 
n/a 
Palmer 
Senior Emergency 
Telecommunicator/ 
Administrative 
Assistant 
No records. n/a
Peabody Chief of Police No officer under that name employed presently or past. n/a 
Pembroke Unknown No complaints. n/a 
Pittsfield City Solicitor 
Preparing good faith estimate of 
costs.  May consider request to 
waive fees once cost is known. 
Yes 
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Plainfield Chief of Police Requested files of an officer not working in Plainfield. n/a 
Plainville Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
Yes 
Plymouth Captain No records. Yes 
Plympton Administrative Clerk No complaints. n/a 
Princeton Acting Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Provincetown Records Clerk No complaints. n/a 
Quincy Captain 
Internal Affairs files not 
considered public records, 
protected under 26(c) privacy 
exemption, Chief of Police 
discretion cited Worcester Telegram 
& Gazette. 
n/a 
Randolph Unknown Person unknown. n/a 
Raynham Chief of Police 
Denied request under exemption 
M.G.L. c. 4, §7.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
Reading Lieutenant No complaints. n/a 
Richmond Town Administrator No records. n/a 
Rochester Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Rowley Keeper of Records Request to waive fees denied. No 
Rutland Keeper of Records No records.  Cc’d:  file. n/a 
Salem Captain No complaints. n/a 
Salisbury Keeper of Records No records. n/a 
Sandwich 
Executive 
Administrative 
Assistant 
No records. n/a 
Saugus Assistant Chief 
No records.  Requests more info 
on the type of info requested for 
the project, offers help with 
project. 
n/a 
Savoy Office Manager No records. n/a 
Scituate Town Administrator 
Requested clarification of the 
request (was it about when the 
Chief was an officer or about his 
entire career?), also states that 
they are new at their job and it 
will take them longer. 
n/a 
Sharon 
Administrative 
Assistant to the 
Chief 
No records. n/a 
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Sheffield Town Administrator No records. n/a 
Sherborn Chief of Police No records.  Cc’d:  records request file. n/a 
Shirley Executive Secretary No records. n/a 
Shrewsbury Town Manager No records.  Telephone call to ask the purpose. n/a 
Shutesbury Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
n/a 
Somerville 
Office of 
Professional 
Standards 
No records. n/a 
South Hadley Keeper of Records 
Need to discuss things by phone 
before complying with request. 
Included phone number. 
n/a 
Southborough Town Administrator No records. n/a 
Southwick Keeper of Records No records. n/a 
Sterling Unknown No records. n/a 
Stoughton Acting Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Stow Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledged connection). 
n/a 
Sturbridge Unknown 
Two phone calls to WNEC prior to 
sending letter to say no citizen 
complaints. 
Yes 
Sudbury Acting Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Sutton Unknown 
Mailed specific memo with no 
cover letter.  Sent memo regarding 
citizen complaint. 
Yes 
Swampscott Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Swansea Town Attorney No records. n/a 
Taunton Detective Captain 
No records.  Called attention to 
the fact that police department 
records are only retained for 7 
years after the closure of the 
action. 
n/a 
Templeton Chief of Police 
Several records responsive to 
request but refuse to provide them 
based upon exemption (f) 
investigatory materials.  3-page 
letter (exact same letter as used in 
Brookfield).  Cc’d:  Town Counsel, 
Selectmen’s Office. 
No 
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Tisbury 
Administrative 
Assistant to the 
Chief 
No complaints. n/a 
Topsfield Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Townsend Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (the response 
acknowledged connection). 
n/a 
Tyngsborough Deputy Chief No records. n/a 
Wales Chief of Police No records.  Called to ask purpose of request. n/a 
Walpole Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Waltham Law Department Estimate of cost of search. Estimated total = $150.00. No 
Ware Administrative Officer 
Denied request under exemption 
M.G.L. c. 4, §7 cl 26(c) n/a 
Wareham Lieutenant No records.  Sent certified mail. n/a 
Warren Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
Wayland Lieutenant No records.  Cc’d:  Town Counsel. n/a 
Wellesley Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Wellfleet Unknown No records. n/a 
Wendell Town Coordinator No records. n/a 
West Boylston Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Requested records 
of the same person who responded 
in the letter. 
n/a 
West Brookfield Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
West Newbury Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
West Springfield Chief of Police No records.  (cc’d:  Town Counsel) n/a 
West Stockbridge Chief of Police No complaints. n/a 
West Tisbury Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Westborough Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Westfield Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledge connection). 
n/a 
Westhampton Administrative Assistant No records. n/a 
Westminster Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter (this response 
acknowledge connection). 
n/a 
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2010] ADJUTANT AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
Municipality Title Of 
Respondent 
Content Fees 
Waived 
Weston Keeper of Records 
Estimate of cost of search. 
Estimated total = $48.06. No 
Westwood Administrative Lieutenant No records. n/a 
Weymouth Acting Chief of Police 
No complaints.  Explained process 
of going through the personnel file. n/a 
Wilbraham Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Williamsburg Acting Chief of Police No records. n/a 
Williamstown Records No complaints. n/a 
Wilmington Deputy Chief No records. n/a 
Winchendon Police Clerk No records. n/a 
Worcester Captain No records. Yes 
Worthington Chief of Police 
No records.  Requested records of 
the same person who responded in 
the letter. 
n/a 
Wrentham Records No complaints. n/a 
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APPENDIX B—MUNICIPALITIES THAT DID NOT RESPOND TO
 
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST
 
Abington Gosnold Milton Southbridge 
Alford Greenfield Monroe Spencer 
Amherst Hadley Montgomery Springfield 
Ashby Hancock Mt. Washington Stockbridge 
Ashfield Hanover Nahant Stoneham 
Barnstable Harwich New Ashford Sunderland 
Belchertown Hatfield New Marlborough Tewksbury 
Berlin Holland Newbury Tolland 
Bernardston Hopedale Norfolk Townsend 
Blackstone Hopkinton North Attleboro Truro 
Blandford Hubbardston North Brookfield Tyringham 
Boston Lakeville Norton Upton 
Brimfield Lancaster Oakham Uxbridge 
Carlisle Lawrence Orleans Wakefield 
Charlemont Leominster Paxton Warwick 
Charlton Leyden Pelham Washington 
Chatham Ludlow Pepperell Watertown 
Cheshire Lynn Peru Webster 
Chester Malden Petersham Wenham 
Chicopee Mansfield Phillipston West Bridgewater 
Clarksburg Marlborough Rehoboth Westford 
Colrain Marshfield Revere Westport 
Conway Mattapoisett Rockland Whately 
Cummington Maynard Rockport Whitman 
Dighton Medford Rowe Winchester 
Douglas Medway Royalston Windsor 
Fall River Merrimac Russell Winthrop 
Falmouth Middleborough Sandisfield Woburn 
Fitchburg Middlefield Seekonk Yarmouth 
Florida Middleton Shelburne 
Foxborough Millis Somerset 
Gardner Millville Southampton 
